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PUBLIC IMPORTANCE: BALANCING
PROPRIETARY INTERESTS AND
THE RIGHT TO KNOW
ERIC

B.

EASTON*

The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would ... [force] state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of
"general or public interest" and which do not-to determine, in
the words of Mr. Justice Marshall, "what information is relevant
to self-government." 1 We doubt the wisdom of committing this
task to the conscience of judges.

-Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 346 (1974).
The enforcement of that provision in this case, however, implicates the core purposes of the First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the publication of truthful information of
public concern. In this case, privacy concerns give way when
balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance. As Warren and Brandeis stated in their classic law review article: "The right of privacy does not prohibit any
publication of matter which is of public or general interest." 2

-Barlnicki v. Vopper, 121 S.Ct. 1764-65 (2001).
INTRODUCTION

Articulating a coherent, all-encompassing First Amendment
doctrine for freedom of speech and of the press has so far eluded
every scholar who has tried, not least because of the variety of analytical approaches and potentially dispositive factors in Supreme
Courtjurisprudence. 3 For example, the same regulation might be

* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.S. Northwestern University, 1968; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 1989. I wish to thank my colleagues Michael Meyerson and Robert Lande for their generous assistance and inspiration.
Whatever errors may be found in this article undoubtedly result from my disregarding
their sage advice.
1 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971).
2 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 214
(1890).
3 See, e.g., Harry Kalven,Jr., A WoRTHY TRADITION 3 (1988) ("The Court has not fashioned a single, general theory which would explain all of its [freedom of speech) decisions;
rather, it has floated different principles for different problems."); Rodney A. Smolla, FREE
SPEECH IN AN OPEN SociETY 18 (1992) ("[M)odern First Amendment problems present an
intricate maze of competing philosophies, sharp social conflicts and complicated legal doc139
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enforceable in one medium, but not another; 4 in one forum, but
not another. 5 Enforceability may depend on the regulator's purpose and drafting skill, or not/' depending in turn on whether the
speech deserves full protection, 7 some protection,!:~ or no protection at allY Sometimes enforceability depends on the speaker's intent,10 or knowledge, 11 or care 12 ... or none of those factors. 13
Sometimes it depends on the speaker's status 14 or access to alternative communication channels; 15 sometimes it depends on the status
trines .... The modern student of free speech will quickly be tempted to abandon the
search for general organizing principles .... "); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
DEMOCRACY AND RoMANCE 2-3 (1993) ("First amendment law now is, if nothing else, a complex set of compromises .... a committee product. ... To formulate an organizing vision
for the first amendment is to risk detachment from social reality.").
4 Compare Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state law requiring newspapers to provide space for political candidates to reply to adverse editorials violated First
Amendment freedom of the press), with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(federal policy requiring broadcasters to provide time for political candidates to reply to
adverse editorials did not violate First Amendment freedom of the press).
5 Compare Madison Jt. Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Empl. Rei. Commn., 429. U.S. 167 (1976)
(school district would violate nonunion teacher's First Amendment right of free speech by
prohibiting him from speaking on collective bargaining negotiations at a public board of
education meeting), with Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37
(1983) (school district did not violate the First Amendment by permitting teachers' exclusive bargaining representative access to the inter-school mail system but denying such access to a rival teacher group).
fi See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC [Turner I], 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994) ("But
while a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a
regulation is content-based, it is not necessary to such a showing in all cases. Nor will the
mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose be enough to save a law which, on its face,
discriminates based on content." (citations omitted)).
7 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials does not justifY an unnecessarily broad suppression of
speech meant for adults).
8 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991) (state public indecency
statute is constitutional despite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity).
9 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.").
10 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action .... ").
II See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-55 (1959) (absent a scienter requirement, an ordinance holding a bookseller criminally liable for stocking an obscene book is
unconstitutional).
I2 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring a public
official plaintiff to show that a libel defendant acted with actual malice, that is knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth).
13 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (generally applicable laws
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press
has incidental effect~ on it~ ability to gather and report the news).
14 See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314-16 (1973) (members of Congress and
their staffs held immune from libel action for ordering or voting for a publication going
beyond the reasonable requirements of the legislative function, but not those legislative
functionaries involved in the publishing or distribution of otherwise actionable materials).
15 See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 ( 1984)
(government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of pro-
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or access of one who objects to the speaker's speech. 16
In any given case, the analysis may begin with the speaker or
the speech, with the regulator or the regulator's putative beneficiary. Although difficult and inconsistent, these analyses are reasonably well-established. Soll1e questions remain unresolved, and new
media-like the Internet-send lawyers scrambling to find appropriate analogs, judges to select among them, and law professors to
second-guess judges. 17 But, in general, the cases tell us what rules
to apply, if not exactly how to apply them.
In a handful of cases, however, the analysis focuses on the
speaker's audience-the listener or reader or public in general.
Because the rights of the listener are poorly defined, and the
power of the public vigorously disputed, 18 consistency is even
harder to find in these cases. This article endeavors to bring some
coherence to this body of law by identifying its source and surveying its contemporary application. Simply stated, this article argues
that the First Amendment's penumbral "right to know" is the
source of a "public importance test" that the Supreme Court has
reluctantly, but ineluctably, adopted to help mediate between the
proprietary claims of private citizens and the reportorial imperatives of the press. It goes on to suggest that, properly applied, this
public importance test has significant implications for freeing proprietary information, whether held by government or private entities. It concludes that several areas of law generally thought to be
exempt from constitutional analysis-newsgathering torts, freedom of information statutes, and especially copyright law-must
be reexamined in light of this test.
Few of the corollary principles that grow out of the First
Amendment have inspired more thoughtful scholarship and impassioned debate than the notion that an implicit right to know
tected speech, provided the restrictions .. .leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information).
16 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (setting a lower constitutional fault standard for libel plaintiffs who are private individuals than for public official
or public figures).
17 Compare Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (treating
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) as "distributors," rather than "publishers" of libelous material), with Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1995 (N.Y.
Sup. May 24, 1995) (treating ISPs as publishers under similar circumstances). See also
Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers: Identifying the "Speaker" Within
the New Media, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 79, 123 (1995) (urging that ISP liability be limited to
those instances where the ISP had a high degree of involvement in the offending speech).
This issue was resolved by Congress in the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230, which immunized ISPs from publisher liability. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
18 See infra text accompanying notes 111-43.
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accompanies the explicit right to speak. In Part I of this article, I
suggest that the right to receive information (a more precise, if
rather awkward, formulation than "right to know") holds a longstanding and positive place in First Amendment jurisprudence as
an indispensable complement to the right to speak. 19
Yet, as Part II demonstrates, some scholars believe that the
right to know precedes, explains, and justifies the right to speak,
and therefore invites or even requires government intervention to
temper the right to speak where necessary to serve the public debate.20 Others, seeing this connection as a dangerous, ideologically motivated infringement on free speech and press, deny the
very existence of a right to know. 21 Still others, uncomfortable with
the implications of a strong right to know, but unable to ·deny its
existence, would enforce the right pragmatically against some
kinds of speech or some kinds of media. 22
In Part III, I assert that the right to know, like the right to
speak itself, is a right that individuals may exercise solely against
their government. In particular, it cannot be used to bootstrap direct government regulation of media content when a broader public interest in "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" debate 23
appears threatened by private actions. 24
Government intervention may be necessary to preserve the
"marketplace of ideas" 2 fi by limiting structural concentration in the
media industry, and proper application of the right to know can
support that purpose, 26 but the First Amendment stands as a bar to
any government intervention that prohibits or compels private
speech.
Having determined what the right to know is not, Part IV identifies the "public importance test" as a manifestation of the public's
right to know and surveys applications of the test in libel and privacy cases from New York Times v. Sullivan27 to Bartnicki v. Vopper. 28
See infra text accompanying notes 38-110.
See infra text accompanying notes 125-31.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 116-24.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 132-43.
23 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
24 See infra text accompanying notes 144-68.
2fi See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail. ... "); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market. ... ").
26 See infra text accompanying notes 169-71.
27 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
28 532 u.s. 514 (2001).
19

20

2003]

PUBLIC IMPORTANCE

143

The test is sometimes called "public interest," 29 sometimes "legitimate public concern," 30 and sometimes "newsworthiness." 31 As a
constitutional fact, the importance of information can bar government suppression of speech and perhaps even discourage punishment when reporters have compromised their own interests
through tortious or criminal acts. 32
Then again, speech is sometimes suppressed or punishment
meted out whether the speech is important or not. Predictability
remains elusive, especially in newsgathering, access to public
records, and copyright. In Part V, I urge the vigorous application
of a public importance test in these areas, which might be characterized as "unwilling speaker" cases. 33 Far from being merely a
"dangerous slogan," 34 or a post-modern construct designed to
thwart the libertarian view of the First Amendment, the right to
know, manifested in this way, offers new support for expanding the
amount of information in the public domain. 35
Part VI raises two cautionary notes: (1) that deference to proprietary rights such as personal privacy, government secrecy, and
copyright may be necessary, as a practical matter, to preserve core
freedoms of speech and publishing, 36 and (2) that investing in
courts the power to determine the public importance undermines
both the political branches and the independent judgment of journalists.37 Nevertheless, I conclude that, once the courts accept the
notion that a First Amendment right to know prevents Congress
2 9 I use the term "public importance" to avoid the confusion inherent in the term "public interest." One dictionary offers two definitions of public interest: "1. the welfare or wellbeing of the general public; commonwealth: health programs that directly affect the public interest. 2. appeal or relevance to the general populace: a news story of public interest." Random
House Unabridged Dictionary 1563 (2d ed. 1993) (emphasis in original). In this article, I am
primarily concerned with the latter, and while "public interest" appears far more frequently in the literature, using "public importance" better preserves the distinction between the two meanings.
30 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968) ("the question whether a
school system requires additional funds is a matter of legitimate public concern on
which .... free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate").
See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting "legitimate public concern"
standard from Pickering).
31 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 n.9 (1964) (noting that the law of privacy
recognizes severe limitations where public figures or newsworthy facts are concerned).
32 See infra text accompanying notes 172-244.
33 It is often said, in a disparaging tone, that if the "right to know" exists at all, it merely
protects from unwarranted government interference the right of a willing listener to hear a
willing speaker. In the case of newsgathering, access to government information, and copyright, however, I argue that the right to know can and should be asserted against government to pry information from unwilling speakers.
34 Lucas A. Powe, Jr., THE FouRTH EsTATE AND THE CoNsTITUTION 257 (1992).
35 See infra text accompanying notes 245-341.
36 See infra text accompanying notes 341-47.
37 See infra text accompanying notes 348-50.
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from having a free hand in restricting the flow of information, the
courts themselves will find the proper balance the way they always
do, one difficult case at a time. In any event, there is no reasonable
alternative.
I.

THE RIGHT TO

KNow

Although Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC~ 8 is generally considered the preeminent "right to know" case, the concept goes back
much further in First Amendment jurisprudence.~ 9 Even before
the First Amendment's right to speak was formally incorporated
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
apply to state law, 40 the U.S. Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska41
averred that the right to receive information was itself protected as
a "liberty interest" by that same Clause. 42 Striking down Nebraska's
World War I-era ban on teaching children to read in German or
other foreign languages, the Court found that the concept of liberty "[w]ithout doubt" includes "the right of the individual. .. to
acquire useful knowledge." 4 ~ Moreover, the Court said,
this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting
the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without some reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect. . . . The American people have
always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters
of supreme importance, which should be diligently promoted. 44

In Meyer, the relationship between the right to know and the
right to speak was symbiotic. Although it is possible to see Meyer as
turning exclusively on the teacher's right to speak, the better view
is that the reversal of Meyer's conviction vindicates both aspects of
this liberty interest. 45
395 u.s. 367 (1969).
See Wilfrid C. Rumble, student author, The FCC's Reliance on Market Incentives to Provide
Diverse Viewpoints on Issues of Public Importance Violates the First Amendment's Right to Receive
Critical Information, 28 U.S.F.L. REv. 793 (1994). Although I obviously disagree with this
Comment's thesis, its author has done an admirable job in assembling the important cases.
4° SeeGitlowv. NewYork, 268 U.S. 652,666 (1925).
41 262 u.s. 390 (1923).
42 /d. at 399 (1923); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510, 53435 (1925) (holding that the liberty interest protects the right of parents to educate their
children in private schools).
43 /d. (emphasis added).
44 !d. at 399-400 (emphasis added).
45 The Meyer Court does not explicitly address whether the teacher had standing to
raise the student's right to receive the German language training. But a later case, Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965), not only settles the issue in favor of the speaker's
standing to raise the constitutional rights of the listener, it even cites Meyer as a case in
which this was done. /d. Griswold's value to this discussion is somewhat limited by the fact
38
39
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Nearly twenty years later, long after incorporation, the Court
reaffirmed the right to receive information in Martin v. City of
Struthers, 46 which struck down a local ordinance barring door-todoor distribution of handbills, circulars, or other advertisementsY
Again, the Court enlisted "the right of the individual householder"
to receive the information in support of the convicted distributor's
right to distribute it. 48
The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope.
The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to
encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance (footnote
omitted). This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature,
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938), and necessarily protects the
right to receive it. 49
As in Meyer, the Court saw no need to state with specificity
whether Martin would have prevailed solely on the ground of her
right to speak, without reference to anyone's right to receive information.50 Both opinions also took the measure of the countervailing government interests, easily finding them inferior, but
neither laid down any rigorous criteria for the balancing test. 51
Other contemporaneous cases also spoke to the right to receive information, 52 but it was not until 1965 that the Court finally
that, ultimately, the holding turned on the unconstitutionality of state prohibition on contraception as an invasion of privacy, rather than merely the right to receive information
about contraception. Still, as suggested below, the·relationship between privacy and the
right to receive information is not without relevance. See infra text accompanying notes
201-244.
46 319 u.s. 141 (1943).
47 See id. at 143.
48 /d. (emphasis added).
49 /d. (emphasis added).
50 The Court's citation to Lovell v. Griffin, another Jehovah's Witnesses case, is curious.
In Lovell, a municipal ordinance barring distribution of handbills without a license was
struck down without reference to the right to receive information. Presumably, the same
rationale would be available to Martin. But the Court's sentence structure would seem to
suggest that the right to receive information stands alone.
51 See Meyer, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) ("No emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its
inhibition with the consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed."), and Martin,
319 U.S. at 147 ("The dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal
methods, leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive.strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the
Constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas.") The language from
Meyer quoted in the text might suggest a modem "rational basis" test, but the better interpretation would be that, having found that the statute failed even that minimal test, 262
U.S. at 403, the Court had no need to look further.
52 See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (reversing the conviction of a
union organizer for speaking to a group of workers without the required state license, on
ground that the license requirement imposed an unconstitutional "restriction upon
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confronted a pair of cases that placed the right to receive before
the Court without a corresponding right to speak. Both cases pit
the appellants' right to receive information against the government's asserted national security interest.
In Zemel v. Rusk, 5 ~ the Court upheld the State Department's
refusal to validate a private citizen's passport for travel to Cuba "to
satisfy [his] curiosity about the state of affairs in Cuba and to make
[him] a better informed citizen." 54 The Court denied that Zemel's
First Amendment rights were implicated by the government's action, distinguishing earlier cases reversing passport denials by the
absence of any asserted interest in expression or association. 55 The
Court conceded that the government's action "renders less than
wholly free the flow of information concerning [Cuba]," but saw
that as a "factor to be considered in determining whether [Zemel]
had been denied due process of law.'' 56
The Court read the government's action as a restriction on
Zemel's right to act, not his right to receive information. 57 Indeed,
the Court's only reference to such a right was even less than lip
service: "The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the
unrestrained right to gather information.'' 5 H
Two weeks later, the Court issued a dramatically different
opinion. In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 5 9 the Court struck down a
federal statute requiring a request in writing as a prerequisite to
the delivery of nonsealed mail from abroad containing Communist
propaganda material. In a very brief and narrow opinion, Justice
Douglas held the requirement an "unconstitutional abridgment of
the addressee's First Amendment rights."Go While he did not say
precisely which First Amendment right was implicated, the right to
receive information is the only logical possibility. 61 Justice Brennan
Thomas' right to speak and the rights of the workers to hear what he had to say.... ") and
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-9 (1946) (reversing the conviction of a Jehovah's
Witness for distributing literature on the sidewalks of a company-owned town, on ground
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit censorship of the information the
residents of the town need to be properly informed, good citizens).
53 381 u.s. 1 (1965).
5 4 !d. at 4.
55 See id. at 16 (distinguishing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 ( 1958), and AfJtheker v. Secretary of Stale, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)).
56 See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16.
57 See id. (emphasis added).
58 lrl. at 17 (emphasis added).
59 381 u.s. 301 (1965).
60 !d. at 307.
61 It might seem as though Lamont's right to refrain from compelled speech is also
implicated by the requirement for a written request. But there would be no compulsion
issue unless Lamont wanted to receive mail that was withheld because of its political content, in this case, the Peking Review. lrl. at 304. Signing for routinely undeliverable mail has
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spells it out in a concurring opinion:
It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific guaran-

tee of access to publications. However, the protection of the Bill
of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from
congressional abridgment those equally fundamental personal
rights necessary to make the express guarantees fully meaningful (citations omitted). I think the right to receive publications
is such a fundamental right. The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to
receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of
ideas that had only sellers and no buyers. 62
So, how are these cases to be reconciled? Although Zemel appears to give short shrift to any right to receive information, the
Court was really looking at the conduct that would be required
before any information could be received. Conduct, other than
"expressive" conduct, is not protected by First Amendment,n3 and
therefore could not prevail over the asserted national security interest. Lamont involved a similar national security interest,M but
against speech, not mere conduct, so the First Amendment right to
receive information was squarely before the Court.
Justice Douglas does not even try to balance Lamont's interest
in receiving the speech in question against the government's interest in suppress~ng it. 65 He simply strikes down the regulation as an
unconstitutional burden, like a license requirement or tax, on the
exercise of Lamont's First Amendment right. 66
never been considered "compelled speech." Lamont's own speech interest plays no role in
the case, although he intended to redistribute the magazine. /d. Nor is the ultimate disposition of the material a factor in government's decision to withhold it. And Justice Brennan's concurrence puts to rest any concern that the sender's speech interests are
implicated. /d. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
62 /d.
63 That, of course, has been the primary doctrinal argument against First Amendment
protection for newsgathering. The author has previously written that Zemel was not really a
newsgathering case, in part because bona fide journalists were receiving State Department
approval to travel to Cuba. See Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the
Cohen Maledicta that Bar First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 1135,
1148 (1997) [hereinafter Easton, 'Two Wrongs].
64 In both cases, the regulations in question were justified in part by the claim that such
intercourse somehow subsidized these antagonistic regimes or furthered their revolutionary aims. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14-15, and Lamont v. Posunaster General, 381 U.S.
301, 310 (1965) (Brennan,]., concurring).
65 It should not be surprising that Justice Douglas does not talk about "balancing,"
famous as he was for his First Amendment absolutism. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Natl.
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 156 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment). In fact, the
notion that there is any balancing to be done in a case involving content-based regulation
would have been anathema to him. For a discussion of the illegitimacy of balancing in such
circumstances, see Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 124-28 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
66 See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 305-6 ("Just as the licensing or taxing authorities in the Lovell,
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By 1969, the Court could declare in Stanley v. Georgia67 that, "It
is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas." 68 Citing Martin, Griswold, Lamont,
and Pierce, Justice Marshall wrote, "This right to receive information and ideas, regardless ofworth (citation omitted), is fundamental to our free society." ~ Significantly, Marshall tied the right to
receive information that the Court, found by the Courtin Stanley to
be inextricably tied to a penumbral privacy right vis a vzs
government:
6

Moreover, in the context of this case-a prosecution for mere
possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person's own home-that right [to receive information] takes on
an added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy. 70

Through Stanley, then, the First Amendment right to receive
information is consistently reaffirmed as an individual right against
the government's interest, even the broad "public interest," in suppressing obscene speech. Two months later, everything changed.
Without citing even one of the cases discussed above, Justice
White co-opts and distorts individuals' right to receive information
in order to uphold the federal government's imposition of the
Fairness Doctrine and its right of reply on broadcasters. His words
in Red Lion have become the mantra of those advocating government intervention in the arena of free speech:
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose
views should be expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and
their collective right to have the medium function consistently with
the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount (citations omitted). It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee (citations omitted). It is
Thomas and Murdock cases sought to control the flow of ideas to the public, so here federal
agencies regulate the flow of mail.").
li 7 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (striking down a Georgia law that imposed criminal penalties for
mere possession of obscene materials).
HH !d. at 564.
()\) ld.
70 !d. at 564.
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the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial
here. That right may not be constitutionally abridged either by
Congress or by the FCC. 71

In Part III, I will more closely examine the thesis that Justice
White erroneously conflated the First Amendment right to know
with a public interest in receiving information that predates the
First Amendment and grows out of the constitutional structure as a
whole. 72 I will not dwell on whether, after correcting their doctrinal foundation, the Fairness Doctrine and other broadcast regulations were constitutionally permissible, although I will discuss the
continuing viability of such regulations. 73 The question that remains for us here is whether the First Amendment ever permits, let
alone compels, government intervention to curtail one speaker's
rights if more speech, from more and more diverse speakers, will
reach the public listeners as a result. 74
This question was not presented in the next "right to know"
case, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 75 in which the Court cited both Red Lion
and the earlier cases to acknowledge a First Amendment right to
receive information. 76 The Court wielded that right to reject the
government's arguments that the First Amendment was not implicated by the Attorney General's refusal to allow a Belgian communist entry to speak at academic meetings. 77
But the Court declined to balance that right against the "plenary" power of the government to exclude aliens, 78 relying instead
on the Attorney General's determination that Mandel had abused
his privilege in previous visits. 79 "What First Amendment or other
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis added).
See infra text accompanying notes 144-68.
73 See infra text accompanying notes 169-71.
74 For this proposition, Justice White apparently relied on the words of Justice Black:
"Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does
not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392
(quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. l, 20 (1945)). Justice Black was saying
that the First Amendment is no defense to application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to a
combination of publishers acting to "restrain trade in news and views," id., making the
phrase singularly inapplicable to anything Justice White was talking about. See infra note 148
and accompanying text.
75 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (upholding the Attorney General's power to refuse to allow an
alien scholar to enter the country to attend academic meetings against the First Amendment rights of U.S. scholars who invited him).
76 See id. at 762-63. The Court cited both Red Lion and the line of cases vindicating
individual First Amendment interests.
77 See id. at 764-65. The government argued that entry involved only action, not speech,
and that American scholars had alternative access to Mandel's ideas.
78 See id. at 765.
79 See id. at 769.
71
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grounds may be available for attacking exercise of discretion for
which no justification whatsoever is advanced is a question we
neither address nor decide in this case." 80
In his dissent, however, Justice Marshall pointed out that there
were two problems with the government's action:
There can be no doubt that by denying the American appellees
access to Dr. Mandel, the Government has directly prevented
the free interchange of ideas guaranteed by the First Amendment. It has, of course, interfered with appellees' personal
rights both to hear Mandel's views and to develop and articulate
their own views through interaction with Mandel. But as the
court below recognized, apart from appellees' interests, there is
also a 'general public interest in the prevention of any stifling of
political utterance.' And the Government has interfered with
this as well. H 1

Marshall went on to make a strong First Amendment case, relying fundamentally on the individual right expressed in Lamont to
show that Mandel was not excludable, 82 but the majority was determined to duck the issue. 8 :~ Although Marshall recognized that the
"public interest" to which he referred was something "apart from"
the individual interests of the appellees, it is not clear whether he
was speaking about a collective right to know or the structural interest I identify in Red Lion. In Kleindienst, unlike Red Lion, the two
concepts were compatible, not conflicting, and Marshall wrote that
government had trenched both. Consequently, the fundamental
difference between them was obscured.
In 1973, the difference resurfaced in another broadcasting
case. The Court held in CBS v. Democratic National Committee
(DNC) 84 that the First Amendment did not compel broadcasters to
RO

81

/d. at 770.
fd. at 776 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Mandel v. Kleindienst, 325 F.Supp. 620,

632 ( 1971)).
H2 See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 781.
H:l See id. at 768-68. In a remarkable admission that it really did not know how to deal
with this individual right to receive information, the m;~ority said:
Were we to endorse the proposition that governmental power to withhold a
waiver must yield whenever a bona fide claim is made that American citizens
wish to meet and talk with an alien excludable under § 212 (a) (28), one of
twounsatisfactory results would necessarily ensue. Either every claim would prevail,in which case the plenary discretionary authority Congress granted the Executive becomes a nullity, or courts in each case would be required to weigh
the strength of the audience's interest against that of the Government in refusing a waiver to the particular alien applicant, according to some as yet undetermined standard.
!d.
84 412 u.s. 94 (1973).
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take paid editorial advertising/'5 but a majority appeared to leave
open the possibility that the First Amendment would not prevent
the FCC from imposing such a requirement in the public interest.86 Grounding its opinion solidly in the Red Lion doctrine, 87 five
members of the Court spoke of the "continuing search for means
to achieve reasonable regulation compatible with the First Amendment rights of the public and the licensees." 88 At the very least, the
majority said, "courts should not freeze this necessarily dynamic
process into a constitutional holding." 89
If the majority opinion in CBS is cautious and deferential, the
separate opinions reveal dramatically how pervasive Justice White's
error had become. Following the Court of Appeals, 90 Justice Brennan, writing in dissent for himself and Justice Marshall, defined the
broadcasters as government actors and found their ban on editorial advertising tantamount to censorship. 91 Relying largely on Red
Lion, Brennan focused on the public's "strong First Amendment
interests in the reception of a full spectrum of views- presented in
a vigorous and uninhibited manner - on controversial issues of
public importance." 92 And those interests, he said, are thwarted by
an absolute ban on editorial advertising. 9 ~
In other words, the First Amendment right to know, far from
being merely an aggregate of individual rights against government
suppression, could be vindicated by government regulation of
broadcasters, i.e., other First Amendment speakers. The fiction
that a broadcaster's ban on editorial advertising was tantamount to
government action was not adopted by the majority, but the "public interest" rationale was warmly embraced by all save Justices Stewart and Douglas.
Justice Douglas, concurring in the judgment, vigorously
disagreed:
I did not participate in [Red Lion] and, with all respect, would
not support it. The Fairness Doctrine has no place in our First
Amendment regime. It puts the head of the camel inside the
See id. at 132.
/d. at 131 ("Conceivably at some future date Congress or the Commission - or the
broadcasters- may devise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and
desirable.").
87 See id. at 101-2.
88 !d. at 132.
89 !d.
9° See Bus. Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
91 See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 180-81 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
\JI! /d. at 184.
9~ See id. at 196-97.
85
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tent and enables administration after administration to toy with
TV or radio in order to serve its sordid or its benevolent endsY 4
Justice Stewart wrote along similar lines, expressing "considerable doubt" over Red Lion and calling the regulatory scheme that it
upheld "within the outer limits of First Amendment tolerability." 95
Taking aim at the notion that government could further regulate
broadcasters' editorial decisions based on First Amendment values,
Justice Stewart said First Arnendmen t values themselves dictated
that editorial decisions be made "in the free judgment of individual broadcasters" rather than by "bureaucratic fiat." 96
Justice Stewart later reiterated that position in a dissent joined
by Justice Douglas in Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations. 97 The cause was lost because the speech in question was gender-based advertising, but Justice Stewart's view was
adopted the following year by a unanimous Court in Miami Herald
v. Tornillo.m" By finally isolating the "right to know" issue from a
regulated medium or disfavored speech, the Court definitively answered the second question raised by Red Lion. There is no right to
know that can justify government intervention to curtail one
speaker's rights-even if more speech, from more and diverse
speakers, will reach the public listeners as a result.
Tornillo's facts are constitutionally indistinguishable from Red
Lion's. Tornillo's right of reply to adverse commentary was
grounded in state law, not federal regulation, but there was otherwise no difference between the two cases,. . . except, of course,
that Tornillo sought to exercise his right of reply in a newspaper,
not on a radio station. With Red Lion decided five years earlier, and
reaffirmed in more recent broadcast cases, 9 Y the Court had only
three alternatives: (1) apply the Red Lion rule in Tornillo, (2) overrule Red Lion, or (3) confine the rule of Red Lion to the broadcast
medium.
Not only does the Court speak approvingly of Justice Stewart's
~~4 I d. at 154 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Douglas explicitly mentioned the "right to know," which he said had been "undermined by our decisions requiring ... a reporter to disclose the sources of the information he comes across in investigative
reporting," id. at 165 (referring to Branzberg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), while allowing
government to avoid giving evidence through the "easy use of the stamp 'secret' or 'top
secret."' ld. at 166 (referring to Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73
(1973). I return to that thought in Part III, infra.
95 Id. at 138 (Stewart, J., concurring).
96 ld. at 146.
\!7 413 u.s. 376 (1973).
\JH 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
99 In addition to CBS v. DNC in 1973, see United States v. Midwest Video Cmp., 406 U.S.
649, 669 n. 27 ( 1972).
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position in CBS v. DNC and Pittsburgh Press, 100 it avoids any mention
of Red Lion. And while the Court spells out the arguments of the
"access advocates" in great detail, it never confronts their underlying premise that concentrat~on of ownership in the newspaper industry undermines the public right to receive information.
Instead, the Court holds that, however valid those arguments may
be, the remedy sought is flatly barred by the First Amendment. 101
Looking back from Tornillo, one finds that the Court has consistently found a right to receive information that trumps the government's right to prevent its reception. 102 At the same time, the
Court has rejected the notion that this right to receive information
ever justifies curtailing the right to speak-at least absent some
constitutional infirmity in the speech (e.g., broadcasting or unlawful advertising) or the speaker (Mandel). The post- Tornillo cases
reinforce and refine both prongs of the doctrine.
For example, the Court upheld the right to receive information even when the recipients were prisoners 103 or students, 104 even
when the speech was commercial, 105 even when the speakers were
corporations, 106 and even when conflicting constitutional values
were present. 107 And it rejected government suppression of speech
even when suppression would favor political candidates 108 or utility
ratepayers 109 whose voices might not otherwise be heard. Only
418 U.S. at 255-56.
See id. at 58.
102 For the moment, I am not considering the government's right to withhold information that it alone owns or possesses. For that discussion, see Part V, infra.
103 See Procunier v. Martinez, 424 U.S. I, 48-49 ( 1976) (per curiam) (striking down regulations governing the censorship of prisoner correspondence, holding that both sender
and recipient derive "a protection against unjustified governmental interference with the
intended communication" from the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
104 See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (rejecting a school district's unfettered
discretion to remove books from school libraries, citing the "right to receive ideas [as] a
necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech,
press and political freedom.").
105 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 757 (1976) (striking down a state ban on the advertising of prescription drug prices,
holding that would-be recipients of the information had standing under the First Amendment to assert their right to receive it).
106 See First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n. 31 (1978) (striking down a
state law limiting corporate contributions to referendum campaigns, asserting that the
"First Amendment rejects the 'highly paternalistic' approach of statutes [ ... ] which restrict
what the people may hear.").
107 See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (striking down a state
law permitting the exclusion of the public from criminal trials, pointing out that "[f]ree
speech carries with it some freedom to listen").
108 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (striking down limits on campaign
spending on the ground that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment.").
109 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. I, 9-10 (1986) (vacating a
100
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broadcast and, later, cable 110 cases held otherwise; but that, it turns
out, has been more than enough to trigger a vigorous academic
debate. I explore that debate now.

II.

THE RIGHT TO KNow MiscoNSTRUED

Any attempt to summarize and characterize the ideological
positions that comprise the scholarship in this area must inevitably
strip away the subtleties and nuances that mark its finest thinking
and writing. The intellectual and even emotional power behind
these arguments cannot but fade in the process, and the reader is
urged to return to the original articles and books to sample (or, as
I have, wallow in) some of the best scholarship of our discipline.
With that apologia, then, I begin with three important and accessible monographs from the past decade: Lucas Powe's The
Fourth &tate and the Constitution, 111 Owen Fiss's The Irony of Free
Speech, 112 and Lee Bollinger's Images of a Free Press. 11 ~ These books,
along with numerous articles by these scholars and others, 114 represent the three main lines of thinking on the extent to which the
First Amendment protects a "right to know"-sometimes articulated, sometimes implied-even at the expense of a "right to
speak" under certain circumstances. 115
Professor Powe ascribes the popularization of the "right to
Commission order requiring a utility company to disseminate the literature of a ratepayers'
organization, relying in part on Tornillo's proscription against curtailing one speaker's right
to speak in favor of another's).
IIO See Turner Broad. Sys. Co. v. FCC (II), 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1998) (applying a Red Lionlike analysis to uphold "must-carry" requirements for cable operators, with the gate-keeping power of private cable operators purportedly supplying the artificial scarcity that justifies government intervention).
I I I See Powe, sufJTa note 34.
112 OWEN M. FISS, THE 1RONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996).
I I~ LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS ( 1994).
1 14 Perhaps chief among the leading scholars most neglected in this analysis is Professor
Cass R. Sunstein, whose more recent work in this area is discussed only briefly in Part VI.
See infra text accompanying notes 345-47.
115 Professor Edwin Baker has recently identified four theories of democracy, and their
corresponding views of the press, in a way that might shed further light on the theoretical
grounding of these positions. To adherents to what Baker calls "elitist" democracy, the
role of the press is essentially limited to "checking" government to prevent it from muzzling the press and prevent it from performing it~ essential mission of exposing cormption
and incompetence among the elites who manage the country. To the "liberal pluralists,"
the press must also reflect the diverse interest~ of various segments of society, alerting
constituencies to threat~ to those interest~ and mobilizing them to protect their interests.
To allow the press to fulfill that function, government must prevent stmctural monopolization and preserve partisanship. "Republicans" fear atomization and seek, instead, the common good of society. The press must be balanced, oqjective, civil and inclusive, and
government press policy must foster, even mandate those values. Finally, what Baker calls
"complex democracy" recognizes the importance of both liberal pluralist and republican
values, and sees the govemment intervening through press regulation to preserve a healthy
balance between them. See Presentation to the Association of American Law Schools, Sec-
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know" following World War II to the institutional press's desire to
manifest its "preferred position" under the Constitution through
special legal privileges for its reporters and editors. 116 By successfully equating the people's "right to know" with "freedom of the
press," rather than insisting on special treatment for its own sake,
Powe argues, the press was ultimately able to secure privileges from
the Court that it neither needed nor, in the end, benefited from. 1 17
And in so doing, it unleashed a monster.
At about the same time, Powe says, Professor Jerome Barron's
influential argument for a new First Amendment right of access to
the increasingly concentrated media was validated in Red Lion's "listener-oriented, right-to-know" opinionY 8 The "right to know" that
had been so arrogantly equated with press freedom was now
turned around to justify press regulation.
Powe sees all subsequent cases, save an aberrational Virginia
Pharmacy, as a repudiation of that model. 119 Nevertheless, he says,
a new generation of academics, including Professor Fiss, rushed to
embrace it as the rationale for inviting government regulation of
the media as a means of overcoming the distortion of wealth and
structural concentration on the marketplace of ideas. 120
Duly crediting the work of other scholars, Powe neatly links
the two "right to know" theories by showing that the institutional
press version inevitably invoked an inquiry as to whether the press
was, indeed, properly fulfilling its obligation to satisfy the public's
right to know. 121 And when the answer is no, as it so often is these
days, the academic version is ready and able to justify government's
step into the breach with appropriate regulation. 122
The right to know is not a right; it's a slogan. Furthermore, it
is a dangerous slogan, because it instantly invites inquiry into the
actual performance of a newspaper. Instead of giving the press
more rights, it runs the risk of denying the press its most sacred
possession, its autonomy. 123
tion on Communications Law, January 2000; see also C. Edwin Baker, 17!e Media that Citizens
Need, 147 U. PENN L. REv 317 (1998).
116 Powe, supra note 34, at 242-43. Powe points out that the Associated Press's Kent
Cooper is generally given credit for popularizing the phrase "right to know" as used in this
discussion. !d.
117 /d. at 243-45.
118 !d. at 245-48. See especially Jerome A. Barron, A Right of Access and Reply to the Press, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967).
119 See Powe, supra note 34, at 248-50.
12o See id. at 250-51. Judith Lichtenberg is also noted. !d.
121 See id. at 255-56. Powe particularly cites the work of Lillian BeVier, William Van
Alstyne and Anthony Lewis. !d.
122 See id. at 256-57.
123 /d. at 257.
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When it really counted, the Supreme Court guaranteed that
the press could perform its various roles in our democracy. But,
apart from Justice Douglas, and with the exception of some overblown dicta from other justices, the Court never saw the right-toknow model as a viable First Amendment doctrine. Whether out of
distrust of the press, distrust of its own abilities, or faithfulness to a
simpler constitutional ideal, the Court never embraced either side
of the right to know. In rejecting that theory, however, it never
endangered the essential autonomy of a free press. 124
Powe's characterization of Fiss's thought is based on two of
Fiss 's influential law review articles from the 1980s. 125 By the mid1990s, he had pulled those views together in the slim but
powerfully argued monograph I examine here. In it, Fiss does not
dispute Powe's analysis of the Supreme Court's shift away from a
right-to-know-based jurisprudence after Red Lion, 126 but unlike
Powe, he finds no satisfaction in it. Indeed, he laments the triumph of press autonomy at the expense of governmental power to
impose regulations that further the democratic mission of the
press: informing the public about its political options. 127
While Fiss concedes that the press needs a "certain amount of
autonomy from the state" to perform that function, 128 and while he
acknowledges that the state will sometimes try to "stifle free and
open debate," 129 he unabashedly looks to the state to act to further
the "robustness" of public debate when other forces, namely market forces, would curtail it.
Government may have to allocate public resources-hand out
megaphones-to those whose voices would not otherwise be heard
in the public square. It may even have to silence the voices of some
in order to hear the voices of others. Sometimes there is simply no
other way. 130
The failure of government to intervene in this way reduces
free press to free enterprise, Fiss says, "and the fate of our democracy will be placed wholly in the hands of the market." 131
Where both Powe and Fiss see the Court's post-Red Lion jurisprudence as a retreat from the regulatory model-Powe hailing it,
!d. at 259.
See Owen Fiss, Why the State? 100 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1987), and Owen Fiss, Free Speech
and Social Structu-re, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405 (1986).
126 See Fiss, supra notel12, at 79.
127 See id. at 82-83.
128 !d. at 50.
12 9 !d. at 3.
l!\O !d. at 4.
l!\l !d. at 78.
124
125
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Fiss bemoaning it-President Bollinger sees it as recognition that
the autonomy model and the regulatory model are merely two
ends of a spectrum of theories the Supreme Court has employed to
strike a proper and rational balance between competing values. 1!12
While the disparate treatment of broadcast and print media in this
regard "makes good sense in terms of both public policy and First
Amendment theory," 133 it is not because broadcasting is structurally different from print, but because partial regulation is generally
better than either universal regulation or no regulation at all. 134
Bollinger explicitly rejects Powe's thesis that an affirmative
governmental role in regulating the press is "fundamentally inconsistent with an open democracy," 135 asserting that Powe's catalog of
governmental abuses is simplistic and inconclusive. 130 Bollinger
finds that Powe's anecdotal evidence fails to show that a beneficent
regulatory structure cannot be created that does far more good
than harm. 137 But Bollinger also takes issue (albeit far more sympathetically) with Fiss and others who predicate their advocacy of
regulation on the failure of the unregulated marketplace to ensure
that the public has the sufficiency and diversity of information it
needs for democratic self-government. 138
In Bollinger's view, the justification for regulation lies not
merely in the failure of the marketplace, but in ourselves:
We have good reason to be wary of ourselves, and we should fear
not just the failures of the market system but our own failures of
intellect. A democratic society, like an individual, should strive
to remain conscious of the biases that skew, distort, and corrupt
its own thinking about public issues. Society should be intellectually humble in the way that a true education tries to inculcate
respect for one's own ignorance and intellectual incapacities.
The upshot is this: even in a world in which the press is entirely
free and open to all voices, with a perfect market in that sense,
human nature would still see to it that quality public debate and
decision making would not rise naturally to the surface but
would, in all probability, need the buoyant support of some
form of collective action by citizens, involving public
See Bollinger, supra note 113, at 109, 145.
!d. at 109.
See id.
135 LuCAS A. PowE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE fiRST AMENDMENT 254-55 (1987).
Powe was himself responding to Bollinger's earlier Freedom of the Press and Public Access:
Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1976).
136 See Bollinger, supra note 113, at 130-131.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 137-38. Here, Bollinger cites Fiss's Why the State, 100 HARV. L. REv. 781
(1987).
132

133
134
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institutions. 139
In other words, even if there were no market failure, even if all
voices could be heard in the marketplace of ideas, we might choose
not to listen. Absent some reformation in the way we make decisions, we might choose to watch soap operas instead. 140
But Bollinger is not sure we are ready for that kind of reform.
And, unlike Fiss, he is not even sure "whether the government can
be trusted with the power to intervene in the field of public debate."141 The public's right to know, which-more like Powe than
Fiss-Bollinger calls a "platitude," 14 ~ is largely irrelevant to his regulatory ideal, which is more interested in satisfying a societal need
to know. Until we know more, Bollinger suggests, the complex system that has evolved seems reasonably healthy. 143
In the view of these scholars, then, the "right to know" is either
an illegitimate slogan that invites government regulation to suppress speech in the marketplace of ideas; a vital protection that
invokes government power against the stifling of diverse voices
when economic power distorts that marketplace; or the mirror that
will ultimately force us to recognize that we really do not want a
fully stocked marketplace of ideas at all, but rather a series of property rights that insulates us from too much information. I consider
the first two in Part III; I return to the third in Part VI.
III.

SLAYING THE LION

To suggest, as Powe does, that there is no "right to know" is to
defy history, 144 case law, 14r; and common sense. Even if one does
not accept the Meiklejohn ian notion that the First Amendment operates exclusively to promote democratic values by ensuring that
citizens have the information they need to make informed political
decisions, 140 other First Amendment values are fully consistent with
139
140

Bollinger, supra note 113, at 139.
Sunstein brings this notion into the Internet age with "The Daily Me." Cass R. Sunstein, republic.com 3-16 (2001).
141 Jd. at 142.
14:.! Jd. at 149.
143 See id. at 143.
14 4 "A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it,
is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with
the power that knowledge gives." Letter from james Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822),
in The Writings oJJames Madison, vol. ix, 1819-1836, 103 (Gaillard Hunted. 1910).
14!> See sujml text accompanying notes 38-110.
14fi See Alexander Meiklejohn, 17ze First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245,
255 ( 1961) ("The First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the
freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern.' It is concerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility.").
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a public right to know. For example, the ability of the press to
perform the checking function on which Powe relies is considerably enhanced by the newsgathering privileges that Powe says the
press doesn't need. 147 The more exotic notion that the First
Amendment right to speak is predicated on the noninstrumental
value of the speaker's personal fulfillment is utterly hollow if there
is no audience. 148 In the end, Powe's condemnation is less an assessment of the right to know than of the powers that some of its
advocates have claimed for it.
Fortunately, those powers simply do not exist. Apart from the
broadcasting (and possibly cable) cases, the Supreme Court has
never held that the First Amendment compels or even condones
the power of government to suppress some speech so that other
speech may be heard. 149 If there is, as Justice White asserted in Red
Lion, a "collective right" to "receive suitable access" to a variety of
diverse voices, and if this right "belongs to the people as a whole"
and may thus be exercised against broadcasters through the people's government, this "right" does not spring from the First
Amendment. 150
Certainly this "right" is not the right of the "individual" discussed in Meyer, which was openly suspicious of infringing such
rights in the name of the "public interest." 151 Certainly it is not the
right of the "householder" in Martin, 152 nor the "addressee" in Lamont, 153 the married couple in Griswold, 154 nor the movie buff in
Stanley. 155 Nor is Justice White's purported First Amendment
See Powe, supra note 34, at 245-48, 260-61.
See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1971).
149 See Associated Press (AP) v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), did not rely on the First
Amendment or its penumbral right to know, but rather on the Sherman·Antitmst Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., in order to force the AP to abandon its anticompetitive practices. Red
Lions repeated allusions to dicta in AP on the First Amendment's support for government
intervention are misplaced. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387, 390, 392. A? invoked government
power against business practices that effectively prevented others from publishing; the injunction did "not compel AP or its members to permit publication of anything which their
'reason' tells them should not be published." AP, 326 U.S. at 20 n. 18. A closer case is
Lorainjoumal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), which upheld use of the Sherman
Act to force a publisher to accept advertising it would otherwise have refused. ld. at 144.
Despite the direct effect on the publisher's overall product, there was no suppression of
the publisher's speech such as that later found in Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 25658. The order affected only commercial advertising, and then only that advertising the
publisher refused in order to drive a competing radio station out of business. Lorain journal, 342 U.S. at 155-56. There was no indication that the publisher was compelled to publish, or prevented from publishing, anything contrary to its journalistic "reason." /d.
IfiO Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
151 262 U.S. 390.
lfi2 319 u.s. 141.
153 381 u.s. 301.
154 381 u.s. 479.
lfi5 394 u.s. 557.
147
148
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"right" an aggregation of these. If nothing else, his use of the word
"suitable" suggests something other than a First Amendment right
to receive information. Stanley had made no such qualification; on
the contrary, Justice Marshall had made the point that right to receive information stood independent of the value of the information or even its eligibility for First Amendment protection. 15 r,
Assuming arguendo that Justice White reached the correct result from a faulty doctrinal analysis, what does justify Red Lion's
conclusion?
First, Red Lion presented two related factors that were not involved in the earlier cases: a speaker whose right to speak at all was
granted by and retained at the sufferance of government, and
speech that might not have reached the listener but for the government's regulation. The influence of the first of these factors is easily seen in the two precedents Justice White selected to support his
assertion that the right of the viewers and listeners is paramount. 157
Both involve the FCC's allocation of licenses among competitors in
the public interest as a question of statutory construction. Neither
mentions the First Amendment nor even remotely deals with the
issue of broadcast content. One of them, however, provides a clue
to the origin of the right that Justice White finds.
·But the Act does not essay to regulate the business of the licensee. The Commission is given no supervisory control of the programs, of business management or of policy. In short, the
broadcasting field is open to anyone, provided there be an available frequency over which he can broadcast without interference to
others, if he shows his competency, the adequacy of his equipment,
and financial ability to make good use of the assigned channel.
The policy of the Act is clear that no person is to have anything in the
nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a license. ~icenses
are limited to a maximum of three years' duration, may be revoked, and need not be renewed. Thus the channels presently occupied remain free for a new assignment to another licensee in the
interest of the listening public.
Plainly it is not the purpose of the Act to protect a licensee
I5fl See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565 ("[M]ere categorization of these films as 'obscene' is insufficient justification for such a drastic invasion of personal liberties guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendment."). Years later, Justice Scalia would also reject the notion
that any speech was "entirely invisible to the Constitution" such that it can be regulated in
a way that, itself, violates the First Amendment. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 38384 (1992).
!57 See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940), and FCC v. Allentown B'casting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1955).Justice White also draws on the writings
of Zechariah Chafee for the Commission on Freedom of the Press, citing 2 Govt. and Mass
Commun. 546 (1947).
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against competition but to protect the public. Congress intended
to leave competition in the business of broadcasting where it found
it, to permit a licensee who was not interfering electrically with
other broadcasters to survive or succumb according to his ability to
make his programs attractive to the public. 158
Evidently, Justice White extrapolated his version of the collective First Amendment right to receive information from the proprietary rights of the public 159-whose ownership of the spectrum is
exercised through Congress and the FCC-and the resulting license obligations of broadcasters. Both are the proper subject of
government oversight and regulation. In that respect, it differs
dramatically from a collective First Amendment right derived by
aggregating individual rights against government suppression.
But Red Lion was not a simple contracts case. Although Justice
White was wrong to draw support for his conclusion from a First
Amendment right to know, he was certainly correct to identify an
overriding public interest in the "widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources." 160 Elsewhere
in the opinion, he correctly identifies that interest as instrumental
in "producing an informed public capable of conducting its own
affairs," which he describes as a "goal" of the First Amendment. 161
That description is fair enough; the judicial and scholarly literature
declaring self-government to be an important, if not the only, reason to protect speech is rich indeed. 162 As long as Justice White
speaks in terms of "consistency" with First Amendment purposes,
or the absence of sanction within the First Amendment for inconsistent governmental action, he is on solid ground. But the framers apparently understood the need for an informed, selfgoverning citizenry to fulfill their constitutional dreams long
before they accepted the need for a written guarantee in a Bill of
Rights. The constitutional scheme itself is a far more focused instrument for producing an informed electorate, or rather, limiting
the electorate to informed citizens. 163 Limitations on who could
Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at 475 (emphasis added).
This reference to the public's proprietary rights in the spectrum should not be confused with the view that First Amendment rights are akin to property rights insofar as they
establish the relationship between the individual and the government. See john 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the Hrst Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 49
( 1996).
160 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
161 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392.
162 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION To SELF-GOVERNMEI'.'T (1948); ZECHARIAH CHAFEEjR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1964); THOMAS I.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966).
163 Madison's Federalist 10, for example, extols the ability of a republican government "to
158
159
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vote for or serve in the Congress, the interposition of a Senate
elected by state legislatures against the "People's House," and the
Electoral College 164 were all aimed at producing decision-makers
from among the nation's educated and knowledgeable elite, not to
mention other characteristics that might seem even less attractive
today.
Indeed, the Federalists saw no need for a Bill of Rights at all,
but accepted it as politically expedient in the face of Antifederalist
warnings that the new national government would trample state
prerogatives and individualliberties. 1fir. Certainly they saw no need
for a First Amendment to educate the masses they had so carefully
excluded from power. By the time the First Amendment was
adopted, even the Antifederalists had lost interest; 166 its language
was terse, debate and explication minimal, and it had only one purpose: to limit federal meddling with pre-existing rights. 167 However the meaning and significance of the First Amendment may
have evolved over the years since ratification, only one change in
the amendment's fundamental nature was ever adopted: after
1921, states, too, were prohibited from interfering with freedom of
speech by virtue of the 14th Amendment. 161'1
Thus, if the public interest on which Red Lion is predicated
comes not from the First Amendment, but from the constitutional
structure as a whole, the regulatory regime that Red Lion sanctioned cannot be a product of the First Amendment's right to
know, even if that right were aggregated. The only "paramount"
right that the public holds in broadcasting is a proprietary one,
which the public acquired by virtue of its natural ownership of the
spectrum. The First Amendment operates to ensure that neither
the owner, i.e., the collective public, nor its steward, i.e., the government, violates the speech, press and related rights of their licensees as they go about the business of bringing the spectrum to life.
refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body
of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the tme interest of their country and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." The.Fedemlist No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
104 U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 3; art. II, § 1.
165 See b:oNARD W. LEW, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 255 (1985). One might argue that
the First Amendment was adopted, in part, to protect some higher value, but the evidence
is less than compelling. About all we know of the original purpose of the First Amendment
is this: ratification of the Constitution depended on a promise to adopt a bill of rights,
including a guarantee to protect a rather ambiguous concept of free speech and press
from abridgment by the new federal government. ld. at 234-35.
166 See id. at 236.
167 In fact, the Senate killed an amendment proposed by Madison to protect speech and
press freedoms from the states as well as the federal government. !d. at 262.
I fi8 See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 652.
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We leave for another day any thorough exploration of whether
content regulation of broadcasting is barred by the First Amendment, notwithstanding public ownership of the spectrum or the
public interest in information from diverse speakers. With each
passing day, the question, like broadcasting itself, grows less important. Briefly, however, this analysis suggests that government may
regulate broadcast industry structure, but not content, with a view
toward ensuring that diverse viewpoints are aired.
The public through its government might have chosen to retain for itself the privilege to speak over the spectrum, as have any
number of other countries, but instead elected to allocate that privilege among private entities. No one doubts that the public,
through its government, has the power to withdraw that privilege
tomorrow, but no one expects such an action either. And, as long
as licensees are privileged to broadcast, they are First Amendment
speakers, whose freedom of speech cannot be abridged by the public or its government.
The obvious analogy is the limited public forum. 169 The public, through its government, invited certain individuals (broadcasters) to speak in a publicly owned place (the electromagnetic
spectrum) subject to a reasonable and necessary time, place, and
manner restrictions (allocating licenses). Having created this forum, the First Amendment requires the public and government to
give up the power of viewpoint-based regulation, including, I submit, the power to ensure by direct regulation that a diversity of
viewpoints is expressed. The public can reclaim that power only by
closing the forum.
That is not to say that the public, through its government, is
constrained by the First Amendment from withdrawing proprietary
rights it has conferred on media companies. The antitrust actions
in APand Lorain journal were not incompatible with the guarantees
of free speech and free press, nor is antitrust scrutiny of media
mergers. 170 And, as discussed in Part V, the First Amendment right
to know demands limits on copyright privileges. What matters is
that, in neither of these cases, is government intervening to suppress some speakers in favor of others. 171
Having thus freed the right to know from its unsavory associa169 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the U. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
("Once [the state] has opened a limited fomm ... [it may not] discriminate against speech
on the basis of its viewpoint.").
170 See Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 503, 517-18 (2001) ("[M]edia mergers should be carefully scrutinized for loss of nonprice competition along the dimension of diversity in programming.").
171 Cable regulation arguably does curtail some of the rights of First Amendment speak-
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tion with broadcast regulation, Powe's primary objection and Fiss's
primary justification go away. I will return to President Bollinger's
analysis after reviewing the jurisprudence that demonstrates the
central thesis of this article: that the First Amendment right to
know is manifest in the "public importance" test that the Supreme
Court regularly applies in libel and especially privacy cases, and inconsistently applies in newsgathering, access, and copyright cases.
IV.

WHERE IMPORTANCE IS ALREADY IMPORTANT

A.
Recognition of the "right to know" should be immediately apparent where the public's interest in speech has been found to alter the fact or scope of the speaker's tort or statutory liability. It
would defy logic to suggest that the First Amendment protects
speech about public concerns solely because of some benefit realized by the speaker.
Before 1964, the relatively few such cases arose in a labor relations context. In 1937, for example, the Court required the Associated Press (AP) to reinstate an employee who was discharged for
union organizing activitiesP 2 The dissent urged that, because
union organizing was a matter of great public interest, AP's ability
to report objectively on that subject was protected by the First
Amendment; realizing that protection, it reasoned, depended
upon AP's ability to fire an editorial employee who was also a
union activist. 173 In 1940, the Court struck down legislation restricting labor union picketing, citing the public interest in labor
relations. 174 And in 1959, the public interest in possible misuse of
federal agency funds was one of the factors prompting the Court to
immunize a government official from the libel claims of employees
ers, but not without a degree of heightened scm tiny unavailable to broadcasters. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 661.
172 See AP v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (holding that requiring a media employer to
reinstate an employee discharged because of union organizing activities did not violate the
First Amendment).
In /d. at 138 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
The daily news with respect to labor disputes is now of vast proportions; and
clearly a considerable part of petitioner's editorial service must be devoted to
that sul~ject. Such news is not only of great public interest; but an unbiased
version of it is of the utmost public concern. To give a group of employers on
the one hand, or a labor organization on the other, power of control over such
a service is obviously to endanger the fairness and accuracy of the service.
/d.
" 4 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940) ("The freedom of speech and
of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of
subsequent punishment.").
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whom he had publicly dismissed. 175
It was only in 1964, however, that the Court came to view the
public interest in the content of speech as a value to be balanced
against other individual or proprietary rights. 176 The case, of
course, was New York Times v. Sullivan 177 , and the balancing test is
obscured somewhat by the way the Court formulated the new rule,
i.e., raising, on constitutional grounds, the degree of a libel defendant's culpability required for recovery when the plaintiff is a public official. 178 The underlying presumption is that all speech about
public officials bearing on their fitness for or performance in office
is a matter of public importance, even if false, and that importance
outweighs the common law interest in reputation. 179 To give effect
to that balance, the Court deprived public-official plaintiffs of their
common-law reputational interest, substituting a narrower, constitutionally limited, reputational interest. That same year, the Court
reinforced this principle by extending it to criminal as well as civil
libel cases. 180
175 See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) ("It would be an unduly restrictive view
of the scope of the duties of a policy-making executive official to hold that a public statement of agency policy in respect to matters of wide public interest and concern is not
action in the line of duty.").
176 Even though Barr speaks in terms of "weighing" individual rights against the public
interest, id. at 565, the public interest addressed in that sentence refers to the public's
interest in protecting officials from frivolous lawsuits. The public interest in the substance
of the speech, misuse of funds, was essentially evidence bearing on whether the defendant
was acting within the scope of his official duties, the sine qua non for finding a privilege. !d.
at 575.
177 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
178 See id. at 279-80 (1964).
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual
malice-that is, with knowledge thin it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.
179 See id. at 271-73.
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks o·n government and public officials. (Citation omitted.) The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and
protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly to
qualify for the constitutional protection. The question is whether it forfeits that
protection by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged
defamation of respondent. ... If neither factual error nor defamatory content
suffices to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct,
the combination of the two elements is no less inadequate.
!d.
180 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
The New York Times rule is not rendered inapplicable merely because an official's private reputation, as well as his public reputation, is harmed. 17w publicofficial rule protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the
people concerning public officials, their seroants. To this end, anything which might
touch on an official's fitness for office is relevant. (Emphasis added.)
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The Court's procedural focus on the status of the plaintiff
when its real concern was the public interest in the content of the
speech at issue became increasingly problematic as lower courts
struggled to apply New York Times. Inevitably, status came to be expressed in terms of public importance, 181 until, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 18 ~ a plurality of the Court voted to drop the surrogacy
altogether and grant New York Times protection to all speech about
matters of "public or general concern." 183
Opposition to the new rule stood on four separate grounds:
(1) that the First Amendment does not tolerate any libel judgments against the news media, 184 (2) that the rule unnecessarily
usurped state libel law, 185 (3) that the rule would subject the press
to 'judicial second-guessing of the newsworthiness of each item
they print," 186 and (4) that courts are better equipped to apply general rules than to balance facts in every libel case. 187 The first can
be dismissed as merely an ideological or idiosyncratic expression;
the third will be more fully examined in Part VI.
It was the second and fourth grounds on which the Court subsequently overturned Rosenbloom. 188 Writing for the Court in Gertz,
Justice Powell found the state's interest in protecting its citizens'
reputations more substantial than Rosenbloom admitted and cautioned that relying on judges' ad hoc determinations in every case
"would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations,"
as well as making supervision of the lower courts "unmanageable."1119 Accordingly, Gertz lays down what Justice Powell characterized as "broad rules of general application," 190 focusing once
again on the status of the plaintiff rather than the newsworthiness
!d.
181 See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 ( 1966) (limiting application of the rule to
positions with "such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in
the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it"); Curtis Publg. Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967)(Warren, CJ., concurring in the result) ("Our citizenry has a
legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of [public figures], and freedom of the
press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events
is as cmcial as it is in the case of 'public officials."').
IH~ 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
l8:'1 !d. at 52.
IH4 See id. at 57 (Black,J., concurring in the judgment).
I H5 See id. at 59 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
1H 6 /d. at 63 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
l87 See id. at 63 (Harlan,J., dissenting); see also id. at 81 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
l88 See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) ("The extension of the New York Times
test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a
degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues
of 'general or public interest' and which do not. ... ").
I H9 /d. at 343.
190 /d. at 343-44.
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of the utterance. 1Y 1
Notwithstanding that repudiation of Rosenbloom, an assessment
of the public interest in the defamatory utterance crept back into
libel jurisprudence, albeit through a back door of sorts. In Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 1\1 2 the Court held that "permitting recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation
cases absent a showing of 'actual malice' does not violate the First
Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of
public concern." 1Y3
One need not join the debate over whether Gertz itself contained this distinction, implicitly or explicitly; 194 it suffices to say
that Justice Powell no longer seemed concerned about the burden
that a "public interest" analysis imposes on judges and, in fact, devoted only two paragraphs to that analysis in this case. 195 Mter Dun
& Bradstreet, the First Amendment requires courts to determine
whether defamatory statements involve matters of public concern,
at least where plaintiffs are private figures seeking to recover presumed or punitive damages without showing New York Times malice.
B.

The right to know, again manifested by a "public importance"
balancing test, is even stronger, and surfaces earlier, in constitutional privacy cases. Even before the Court extended the New York
Times rule to public-figure libel plaintiffs, 1v6 it held in Time, Inc. v.
HilfY 7 that privacy interests involving false, but not defamatory,
speech must yield to constitutional protections for speech and
press, absent knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. 198
Although largely couched in terms of protecting the speaker, 199
Justice Brennan makes clear that the constitutional guarantees are
"not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of
191 This is not to say that characterizing libel plaintiffs as public or private figures is
without its own problems. Although Powell averred that "we have no difficulty in distinguishing among defamation plaintiffs," id. at 344, subsequent cases would suggest otherwise. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Assn., 443 U.S. 157 (1979), Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
l\l2 472 u.s. 749 (1985).
l\l3 Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
l\l4 See id. at 761 n.7.
I \l5 See id. at 762-63.
1\l6 See Curtis Publg. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967).
197 385 u.s. 374 (1967).
1 \JS See id. at 387-88. Despite Justice Brennan's admonition that even a negligence standard would place an intolerable burden on the press in this context, some court~ have
applied the Gertz rationale to false light privacy cases. See, e.g., Dresbach v. Doubleday &
Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 (D.D.C. 1981).
199 See Hill, 385 U.S. at 389.
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us."j! 00 This is, unmistakably, the right to know.
The right to know is strongest, of course, when the speech in
question is true. Beginning with Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 201
the Court has inched its way toward a still-undeclared declaration
that truthful speech may never be suppressed or punished to protect individual privacy interests-if at all. From Cox Broadcasting's
limited holding that no liability could be imposed for publishing
truthful information taken from official court records, 202 the doctrine evolved to cover nearly all truthful information about matters
of public significance.j!03 In Bartnicki v. Vopper, 204 the Court
brought the doctrine to its highest level to date.
In Bartnicki, an unknown person intercepted a cellular telephone conversation between Gloria Bartnicki, a Pennsylvania
teachers' union negotiator, and Anthony Kane, president of the
union local. The conversation pertained to on-going negotiations
between the union and the school board, including possible strike
preparations and "the need for a dramatic response to the board's
intransigence."j! 05 At one point in the conversation, Kane says: "If
they're not gonna move for three percent, we're gonna have to go
to their, their homes ... To blow off their front porches, we'll have
to do some work on some of those guys." 206
Whoever taped the conversation delivered it to the head of a
local taxpayer's organization, who, in turn, delivered it to Frederick Vopper, a local radio commentator, and other media outlets.
The taped conversation was repeatedly broadcast by Vopper and
others, and its substance was published in local newspapers. Alleging that each of the defendants "knew or had reason to know" that
the original intercept was illegal, Bartnicki and Kane sued under
both federal and Pennsylvania law, which criminalized the knowing
200

!d.
420

u.s. 469 (1975).
See id. at 496.
203 See Oklahoma Publg. Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977) (holding that
publication of truthful information revealed in open court could not be suppressed); see
also Landmark Comm. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (holding the First Amendment
prohibits criminal punishment of third persons who are strangers to the inquiry, including
the news media, for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding confidential
proceedings of a judicial review commission); Smith v. Daily Mail Publg. Co., 443 U.S. 97,
103 (1979) (holding that publication of truthful information, lawfully obtained, may not
be punished absent a need to further a state interest of highest order); Florida Star v.
BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that publication of truthful information, lawfully
obtained, may be punished "only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest
order").
204 121 S. Ct. 1753 (2001).
205 !d. at 1757.
201

202

2oo !d.
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disclosure of an illegally intercepted conversation. 207 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court rejected Vopper's
First Amendment defense, but granted his motion for an interlocutory appeal. 208 The Court of Appeals applied an intermediate scrutiny standard209 to hold the statutes unconstitutional as deterring
more speech than necessary to protect the privacy interests at
stake. 210
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted petitioners' contentions
that the original intercept was illegal and that respondents had reason to know that fact. The Court also accepted respondents' assertions that they played no part in the intercept, that they committed
no unlawful act in gaining access to the tape, and that the "subject
matter of the conversation was a matter of public concern." 211
In the opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court acknowledged that the law was content neutral, but also found the statutes'
disclosure provisions aimed directly at "pure speech," rather than
conduct or any hybrid of the two. 212 Without explicitly characterizing the degree of scrutiny it would apply, the Court proceeded to
"consider whether, given the facts of this case, the interests served
by§ 2511 (1) (c) can justify its restrictions on speech." 213 The Court
minimized the government's asserted interest in deterring illegal
interceptions 214 and focused instead on the "considerably
stronger" interest in privacy. 215 "In this case," the Court said, "privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance" 216 and no "stranger's illegal
conduct" can "remove that First Amendment shield." 217 In a concurring opinion written "only to stress the narrowness of the
207
208
209
21o
211

/d. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(c) and related provisions).
See Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1758.
See id. (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1999)).
See Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 129.
Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1760.
If the statements about the labor negotiations had been made in a public arena
- during a bargaining session, for example - they would have been newsworthy.
This would also be true if a third party had inadvertently overheard Bartnicki
making the same statements to Kane when the two thought they were alone.

/d.
/d. at 1761.
/d. at 1762. Although this sounds like ad hoc balancing, the Court is presumably
applying strict scrutiny. In O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), which spells
out the generic intermediate scrutiny test, the asserted governmental interest must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression." Apparently, Justice Stevens found the regulation of "pure speech" too closely related to the suppression of free expression to warrant
intermediate scrutiny in this case.
'
214 See Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1762.
215 /d. at 1764.
216 /d. at 1765.
217 /d.
212
213
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Court's holding" in light of physical threats to board members
within the taped conversation, 218 Justice Breyer reached the same
conclusion as the majority by asking only whether the statutes
struck a "reasonable balance between their speech-restricting and
speech-enhancing consequences." 219 Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, condemned the majority's "tacit application of strict scrutiny"220 and applied intermediate scrutiny to reach the opposite
result. 221
So how does Bartnicki contribute to the Court's right-to-know
jurisprudence and help to define the concept? The focus of the
constitutional inquiry is on the rights of the speaker, Vopper, not
those of his radio audience. It is Vopper's right to publish the information-the nature of its acquisition apparently of little concern to anyone on the Court, as long as Vopper was not involvedthat trumps Bartnicki's right to keep it private. The only reference
to the listener is oblique: the high Qustice Breyer says "unusually
high" 222 ) public interest in the labor dispute and any information
about it.
But that oblique reference precisely identifies Bartnicki's contribution to right-to-know jurisprudence: in its aggregated form,
the individual's right to know is the public importance of specific
information that the Court here called a "matter of public concern." At some point, that importance negates the state's interest
in suppression, as well as private interests in reputation and privacy, even where acquisition of the information is tainted by illegal
conduct. Evidently, the bar is not terribly high, for, contrary to the
Court's assertion, Vopper's legitimate interest in broadcasting the
tape was really quite low. 223
For years now, the Court has equivocated on whether publication of illegally acquired information can be punished. If the Pentagon Papers case settled the issue as to prior restraint, 224 Chief
Justice Rehnquist here points out that five justices may well have
voted then to punish the newspapers for publishing the purloined
documents. 225 The constitutional privacy cases are replete with
218
21\l

ld.
fd.

at

1766.

Id. at l 770.
See id. at l 772.
222 ld. at 1768.
223 The emphasis is mine, but it mirrors Justice Breyer's emphasis on the limited legitimacy of Bartnicki's privacy interest. See id. at 1767. I use the word "legitimate" somewhat
facetiously, of course, since I believe the Court's traditional positions as described here are
generally wrong.
224 See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
225 See Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1776.
22o
221
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cautionary disclaimers, 226 enough to persuade lower courts that
they could enjoin or punish illegally acquired speech. 227 In Bartnicki, though, the taint of unlawful acquisition seems to be of little
consequence. But if it had any effect at all, it must have been to
reduce, not enhance, Vopper's interest in publication.
Moreover, the majority's suggestion that the information
would be fair game if overheard 228 is more than offset by the factalluded to in all three opinions-that Vopper's broadcast could
have been enjoined or punished if the conversation had been
taped by its authors, Bartnicki and Kane, and protected by copyright.229 Before Bartnicki, one could even argue along similar lines
that the speech in question was not Vopper's at all, so how strong
could his interest have been? 230
Notwithstanding Justice Breyer's apparent concern for the
safety of the school board (as in ''I'm shocked, shocked to find that
gambling is going on in here." 231 ), the Supreme Court long ago
recognized that hyperbole permeates the speech of union officials
226 See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.]. F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8 (1989) ("The Daily Mail principle
does not settle the issue whether, in cases where information has been acquired unlawfully
by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well. This issue was raised but not definitively resolved
in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and reserved in Landmark Communications, 435 U.S., at 837. We have no occasion to address it here.").
227 See Easton, supra note 63, at 1187-91 (1997) (discussing various cases in which the
court imposed or considered injunctive relief or damages for publishing illegally acquired
information).
228 See Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1760.
229 The majority cites Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985),
for the proposition that communications privacy is an important government interest.
The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints
on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to
speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and
within suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one
which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative
aspect.
Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1764 n.20 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559, which in turn
quoted Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)).
Justice Breyer refers to the same passage to suggest that the statutes at issue "directly enhance private speech," Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1766, as does Chiefjustice Rehnquist. Id. at
1775.
230 See Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, judm.
vacated, 121 S.Ct. 2190 (2001), another of the three cases that created the conflict in the
circuit~ that the Court sought to resolve by granting certiorari in Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at
1758 (citing Peavy v. WFM-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000). The Boehner court,
which upheld the provisions at issue in Bartnicki, had ridiculed the defendant's assertion
that his disclosure of an intercepted telephone conversation constituted protected speech:
[T]hose who expose private activity to public gaze are not necessarily engaging
in speech, let alone "the freedom of speech." ... The tape does indeed contain
speech about political matters. But the speech is not McDermott's and
§§ 2511(1)(c) does not render him liable for anything anyone said on the
recording."
Boehner, 191 F.3d at 466.
231 Casablanca (Warner Bros. 1942).
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and discounted it for purposes of libel. 232 Absent a trial record,
there is no way to determine how serious this "threat" might have
been, and Justice Breyer correctly absolved editors of the responsibility for making such determinations. 233 But Vopper only broadcast the threat after the parties accepted a nonbinding arbitration
proposal that was generally favorable to the teachers. 234 Vopper
himself had been critical of the union, as was the intermediary
from whom he received it. 235
On the other hand, one is hard pressed to find fault with
Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis of Bartnicki and Kane's privacy
interest, 236 or the larger societal interest in encouraging private discussion of public matters. 237 Pointing out that the Court "does not
even attempt to define" the "amorphous concept" of "public concern," Chief Justice Rehnquist charges that the decision "diminishes, rather than enhances, the purposes of the First Amendment:
chilling the speech of the millions of Americans who rely upon
electronic technology to communicate each day." 238
There are three possible explanations for this decision, each
of which is reflected in Justice Stevens's opinion. First, the Court
may have viewed this case as the next unavoidable, incremental
step toward deciding that "truthful publication may [n]ever be
232 "[F]ederal law gives a union license to use intemperate, abusive, or insulting language without fear of restraint or penalty if it believes such rhetoric to be an effective
means to make its point." Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283
(citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 60 (1966)).
233 See Bartnicki, 121 S.Ct. at 1768.
234 See id. at 1757.
235 See id.
236 Pointing out that 40 states and the District of Columbia had enacted similar prohibitions on knowing disclosure of intercepted conversations, Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted
congressional findings that,
tremendous scientific and technological developments that have taken place in
the last century have made possible today the widespread use and abuse of
electronic surveillance techniques. As a result of these developments, privacy of
communication is seriously jeopardized by these techniques of surveillance ....
No longer is it possible, in short, for each man to retreat into his home and be
left alone. Every spoken word relating to each man's personal, marital, religious, political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor and turned against the speaker to the auditor's advantage.
/d. at 1769 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Sen. Rpt. 90-1097, at 67 (1968)).
237 Indeed, both the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens quoted from a 1967 Presidential
Commission:
In a democratic society privacy of communication is essential if citizens are to
think and act creatively and constructively. Fear or suspicion that one's speech
is being monitored by a stranger, even without the reality of such activity, can
have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas.
Bartnicki, 121 S.Ct. at 1769-70 (quoting President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 202 ( 1967)).
238 Bartnicki, 121 S.Ct. at 1769.
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punished consistent with the First Amendment." 239 This question
has plagued the Supreme Court at least since Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn240 in 1975 and perhaps, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
headcount notwithstanding, since the Pentagon Papers case in
1971. 241 Justice Stevens recites Daily Mail's admonition that "state
action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom
can satisfy constitutional standards," 242 but he also emphasizes the
narrowness of the Bartnicki holding. 243 Bartnicki is a major step toward the end game, but the Court is not yet ready to predicate its
decisions on a doctrine of absolute protection for the category of
truthful speech.
The second possibility is that one or another of the balancing
tests is really at work here. I have already noted the ambiguity in
the standard used by the Court; in truth, the actual analysis seems
just about the same in all three opinions. A cynic might say that
the press always wins when strict scrutiny is applied; that the press
usually loses when the Chief Justice applies intermediate scrutiny;
and that no prediction is possible when Justice Breyer balances values ad hoc. .But if Bartnicki is merely Justice Stevens leading the
Court in an application of strict scrutiny, what in these facts compels that test? Stevens calls it "pure" speech, perhaps to distinguish
it from the hybrids (symbolic speech, expressive conduct) that in/d. at 1762.
420 U.S. 469 (1975) (denying recovery against a newspaper for publishing the name
of a rape victim that appeared in official court documents). Other cases in that line include Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (barring prosecution of
a nonparty newspaper for publishing truthful information about a confidential proceedings of a judicial disciplinary commission); Oklahoma Publishing v. District Court, 430 U.S.
308 (1977) (striking down an injunction against publishing the name of a juvenile offender tried in open court); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (barring prosecution of newspaper for publishing the name of a juvenile suspect obtained· by
interviewing witnesses, the police and a prosecutor); and Florida Star v. BJ,F., 491 U.S. 524
(1989) (denying recovery against a newspaper for publishing the name of a sexual assault
victim obtained from a publicly released police report). See supra note194.
241 403 u.s. 713 (1971).
242 Bartnicki, 121 S.Ct. at 1762.
243 See id. at 1764. As noted above, Justice Breyer is also intent on stressing the narrowness of the opinion, although his protest is less than convincing. See supra text accompanying notes 218-19. Rather than merely avoiding the categorical slippery slope that Justice
Stevens fears, Justice Breyer seems more concerned to limit the "public interest" exception
lest it "swallow[ 1 up" privacy law. Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1768. The reference is to Professor Kalven's observation of state privacy litigation.
Professor Kalven notes, however, that since Warren and Brandeis championed an action against the press for public disclosure of truthful bu·t private details about the individual which caused emotional upset to him, "it has been agreed that there is a· generous
privilege to serve the public interest in news .... What is at issue, it seems to me, is whether
the claim of privilege is not so overpowering as virtually to swallow the tort. What ta1.1.be
left of the vaunted new right after the claims of privilege have·been confronted?" [Ha'rt.y 1
Kalven, Qr.,1 Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 326, 335-336 (1966).
239

240
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voke O'Brien. But the Court applied an intermediate scrutiny to
the viewpoint-neutral regulation of pure speech in Turner. Prohibiting the disclosure of intercepted conversation would seem to be
the same type of viewpoint-neutral regulation.
The third is, I think, the most compelling explanation: the
right to know simply trumps all privacy interests. That is, privacy
interest will never prevail when the information is a matter of public importance. That has long been the common law rule, 244 and it
follows the logic of previous constitutional libel and privacy cases.
The right to know limits damages when the speech in question is
false and defamatory; might it not limit liability itself when the
speech is true and important? If that is so, then it would seem to
follow that the right to know ought to have a significant influence
on the outcome of cases in which truthful and important information is sought by the press for the benefit of the public, even where
the speaker is unwilling to disseminate that information.

v.

WHERE IMPORTANCE SHOULD BE IMPORTANT

Writing in 1991, 245 President Bollinger saw a vital corollary of
the right to know-the right to gather news-as "the most powerful force driving us toward" a new conceptualization of press
freedom. 246
The public must know what is happening within official
quarters, not only to maintain the ability to participate effectively
but also for the purifying effect public scrutiny has on the decisionmaking process (giving rise to the metaphor that sunshine is the
best disinfectant). A compelling logic in the newsgathering right
says that the right to speak is meaningless if one has nothing to
report. 247
Recognizing a robust newsgathering right, however, will force
us to face the uncomfortable truth that we really do not trust the
process ofwide-open public debate with full information, Bollinger
said. 248 It threatens the comfort level we now have in exalting freedom of speech and the press, "because we know in our hearts that
2 44

See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993).
People who do not desire the limelight and do not deliberately choose a way of
life or course of conduct calculated to thrust them into it nevertheless have no
legal right to extinguish it if the experiences that have befallen them are newsworthy, even if they would prefer that those experiences be kept private.

!d.
2 45 Shortly before the newsgathering right was sharply curtailed by the legacy of Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). See Easton, supra note 63.
24fi Bollinger, supra note113, at 145.
247 ld. at 146.
248 See id. at 150.
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truly harmful situations will rarely arise because we retain the ability to keep really dangerous information secret." 249 Referring primarily to the power of government to withhold its own secrets,
Bollinger asserted that we rely on "the law of property" to protect
us from completely uninhibited dissemination of information,
even as we "claim a contrary self-image." 250
Although Bollinger's primary concern in 1991 was to justifY
differential regulatory treatment of print and electronic media, he
was on to something far more important. Recognizing that freedom of the press was becoming a struggle between property and
access, Bollinger saw that concepts such as "'public controversies,'
newsworthiness, and the fact-opinion distinction" then emerging
from libel jurisprudence would be important factors on the access
side of that struggle. 251 But Bollinger missed the connection between these concepts and the public's "right to know," a phrase for
which he had little use.
One suspects that Bollinger saw in the notion of a "right to
know" the ultimate, unqualified triumph of access over property,
which he was unprepared to accept. If one views the right as manifested by "'public controversies,' newsworthiness, and the factopinion distinction," and therefore qualified by these and similar
concepts, the right becomes a significant, but not necessarily dispositive weight on the side of access. The Supreme Court seems to
have recognized this principle in the area of personal privacy, and
it has worked to find the proper balance the only way it can, one
case at a time. Bartnicki is just the latest case in that search.
But the Court has not been nearly as receptive to these manifestations of the public right to know in three other areas: news
gathering torts and access to public records, both of which were
cited by President Bollinger, and copyright. This needs to be
remedied.

A.
I have written elsewhere that the impositiOn of liability for
newsgathering torts requires some degree of First Amendment
scrutiny apart from any constraint on the punishment meted out
for publishing the fruits of such questionable conduct. 252 In Bart/d. at 147.
145.
251 /d. at 151.
252 See Easton, supra note 63, at 1206-15 (arguing for a constitutional rule protecting
newsgathering absent bad faith or outrageous behavior).
249

250 /d. at
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nicki, the Supreme Court neady sidestepped the issue, along with a
companion case that could have presented it squarely.
In Peavy v. lW<ftA-Tv, Inc., 253 Carver Dan Peavy was an elected
trustee who controlled the purchase of insurance for employees of
a public school district. His incriminating cordless telephone conversations were intercepted by a neighbor who, in turn, brought
tapes of the conversations to WFM-TV. 254 Mter consulting outside
counsel, the station commenced an investigation into suggestions
of bribery and other wrongdoing that appeared on the tapes. 255
The neighbor was encouraged to provide additional tapes and instructed as to the best way to create tapes for broadcast. 256
Before any broadcast took place, however, counsel told the station that its previous advice had been incorrect, that the interception was illegal, and that the station ought not accept any more
tapes, broadcast them, or otherwise use or disclose their contents.257 The station complied with that advice and broadcast three
reports based on alternative sources. 258 The broadcasts did, however, cover some of the same material that appeared in the
tapes. 259 Peavy was indicted, tried and acquitted on all charges. 260
He subsequently sued WFM-TV, alleging violations of federal and
state wiretap laws. 261
The district court granted summary judgment for WFM-TV
on grounds that the station did not procure or obtain the tapes in
violation of the wiretap laws and that its use and disclosure of their
contents were protected by the First Amendment under a strict
scrutiny standard. 262 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the summary judgment on the question of whether the station procured the tapes in violation of the acts. 263 It also summarily
rejected defendant's apparently half-hearted .First Amendment defense of its newsgathering practices. 264 The court then reversed the

253
254
255

221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 164.
See id. at 164-65.
256 See id. at 164.
257 See id. at 165-66.
25B See id. at 166.
259 See id.
260 See id.
261 See id. Specifically of concern here were the questions of whether WFM-TV procured the tapes in violation of the federal wiretap act, 18 U.S.C. 2511 (1) (a), or the largely
parallel Texas statute, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 123.002(a)(1); and whether WFM-TV
used or disclosed the contents of those tapes in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2511 (1) (c) & (d)
and Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 123.002(a) (2).
26:.! See Peavy, 221 F.3d at 166-67.
263 See id. at 194.
264 See id. at 172.
In a footnote to their contention there is no "procurement" action, defendants conclusorily
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summary judgment on use and disclosure and, adopting an intermediate scrutiny standard, upheld the statutory provisions against
the station's as-applied challenge. 265
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, 266 and the case settled for a reported $5 million. 267 The question of whether and how
the First Amendment protects a publisher's use and disclosure of
information obtained illegally by its own reporters will have to wait
yet another day.
What was especially troubling about this case was the possibility that important information might never have been brought to
the public's attention. Here, the information· concerned apparently unlawful behavior by an elected official in a position of trust.
Because that information was brought to a television station as the
result of an illegal interception, the station faced civil and criminal
liability and, in the end, paid a substantial settlement for using the
information it learned to develop the story through legitimate
sources and for disclosing facts to the public that happened to be
on the intercept tapes, notwithstanding the station's independent
efforts.
Even if the courts had ultimately held that the First Amendment protects the publication of important information, whether
lawfully or unlawfully acquired by the publisher, reporters and editors may still decline to pursue such stories where, as here, their
newsgathering practices raise separate grounds for liability. In this
case, a lawyer, albeit no expert in this field, counseled the station
"not to accept additional tapes, not to broadcast any tapes, not to
disclose the contents of the tapes to third parties, and not to confront individuals about the conversations on the tapes, unless the
information was available from other sources. "268 The court would
later nullify the tiny safe harbor in that final clause, 269 and yet still
assert: "if procurement is construed as broadly as [the Peavys] would have it, the ... provision also would be unconstitutional as applied ... and on its face." ... Obviously, assuming
defendants intend this to apply to the "obtains" claim, it is not adequately briefed. In any
event, it is without merit. Defendants have essentially conceded the First Amendment
would not bar an action against them for interception. There is no basis for distinguishing,
for First Amendment purposes, between a person intercepting, on the one hand, and obtaining it through someone else, on the other. (Emphasis in original.)
Id. As a technical matter, the word "procure" is used in the operative provision of the
federal statute, which, the court held, afforded Peavy no civil damages; "obtain" is used in
the state statute, which, the court held, did provide for recovery. The court somewhat blurs
the fact that the Texas statute speaks not of obtaining the intercepted material, but rather
of obtaining a person to intercept the conversation.
265 See id. at 194.
266 See \\'FAA-TV, Inc. v. Peavy, 121 S. Ct. 2181 (2001).
267 See Belo, Peavy Settle Suit Over Wf/1A Reports, Dallas Morning News 34A (Oct. 19, 2001).
268 Peavy, 221 F.3d at 165-66 (emphasis in original).
269 See id. at 174 ("In correctly rejecting defendants' reliance on [attenuation doctrine],
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declare it "highly unlikely [that the burden the acts impose on
journalists] will result in 'timidity and self-censorship' .... "270
If a similar case ever rea~hes the Supreme Court, there may
yet be an opportunity to reconsider a First Amendment defense for
the publisher's initial conduct in acquiring the information. The
only way to ensure that such stories as this one reach the public ear
is to temper today's misguided rule that newsgathering torts are
nothing more than "generally applicable laws" that "do not offend
the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news." 271 Recognizing the public's right to know serves that purpose well by requiring some heightened degree of First Amendment scrutiny whenever the information in question is a matter of
legitimate public concern.
I have previously urged that the First Amendment must protect tortious and even some criminal conduct in good-faith pursuit
of a bona fide story, absent outrageous behavior. 272 Such conduct
should be immunized as to public figure plaintiffs or where, as
here, the defendant is covering government operations. 273 While
the Peavy court properly rejected an "ignorance or mistake of the
law" defense, based on the journalists' good-faith belief that their
actions were lawful, 274 the journalists acted quite reasonably in
light of the information they had. Indeed, to have dropped the
story once they heard the tapes, which the court suggests they were
bound to do, 275 would have been the greater breach of faith with
the public.
At the very least, an ad hoc balancing of interests would have
dictated a finding of no liability for WFAA-TV and its employeesprovided, that is, that the public's right to know is recognized as a
legitimate interest. Indeed, such a balancing might be precisely
what is needed to vindicate the public's interest when important
information is "owned" by public or private entities.

the district court stated: 'The fact that [defendant] later obtained the same information
from independent sources' was irrelevant.").
270 /d. at 190.
271 /d. at 185 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 669 (1972)(emphasis added).
272 See Easton, Two Wrongs, supra note 63.
273 See id. Private figure plaintiffs would be limited to compensatory damages absent
such a showing.
274 Peavy, 221 F.3d at 178-79.
275 See id. at 176 (rejecting defendants' contention that, to preserve vital First Amendment interests, the court should construe the proscribed "use" and "disclosure" narrowly to
exclude exploring leads from lawfully obtained sources).
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B.

In the previous section, I argued that the invocation of generally applicable law requires some degree of First Amendment scrutiny when employed against a gatherer of news acting on behalf of
the public. If there is even a scintilla of validity to that position,
then surely First Amendment scrutiny is required when a law enacted to facilitate the dissemination of information to the public is
invoked to keep information from the public. This section and the
next explore the relationship between the right to know and access
to governmental and privately owned information.
Few constitutional principles are as well settled or as often repeated as the absence of a First Amendment right of access to government information. 276 Indeed, President Bollinger paraphrases
Alexander Bickel, who represented the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case, to the effect that "it will never be feasible to
develop a press (or public) right to obtain government-held information."277 Bickel reasoned that it would be better to leave the
government and the press to their own best efforts in protecting
and pursuing, respectively, important information than to give
judges the power to compel disclosure and, concomitantly, forbid
publication. 278
Justice Potter Stewart perhaps put it best:
There is no constitutional right to have access to particular government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy. The public's interest in knowing about its government is
protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is
indirect. The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.

The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not
its resolution. Congress may provide a resolution, at least in some
276 See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) ("This Court has never intimated a
First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within government control."); Saxbe v. Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (quoting Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974): "Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or
their inmates beyond that afforded the general public."); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 684 (1972) ("[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional
right of special access to information not available to the public generally."); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the
unrestrained right to gather information."). But see Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-600 (1978) (discussing the common law right of access to court
documents); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (I), 464 U.S. 501, 512 (access to court
records may be constitutionally required even where the proceeding itself was properly
closed).
277 Bollinger, supra note 113, at 148 (paraphrasing ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALI"!Y OF
CoNSENT 78-86 (1975)).
278

See id.
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instances, through carefully drawn legislation. For the rest, we must
rely, as so often in our system we must, on the tug and pull of the
political forces in American society. 279
Be that as it may, the government may not ignore the First
Amendment once it decides to make information available. In
Saxbe v. Washington Post, 2 ~:~ 0 for example, the Court upheld a Bureau
of Prisons regulation governing media access to federal prisoners
against a First Amendment challenge precisely because the regulation did not deny the press access to sources available to members
of the general public. 281 Had the regulation barred only credentialed reporters, it would surely have been held unconstitutional as
singling out the press for special treatment. 282
In a more recent access case, the Supreme Court rejected a
facial challenge to a California statute regulating access to the addresses of persons arrested by police. 283 The Court pointed out
that California could have decided not to give out arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment. 284 But eight
justices agreed that the Constitution would limit California's freedom to decide how to distribute the information if the state had
decided to make it available. 285 In my view, a "public importance"
test would be the logical manifestation of any such limitation; it
remains only to examine how such a test might work in practice.
Whether the press and public should have access to information in the hands of government is unquestionably determined by
279 Potter Stewart, OrofthePress, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631,636 (1975) (quoted in Houchins,
438 U.S. at 14-15).
280 417 u.s. 843 (1974).
281
!d. at 850.
282 See, e.g., Minn. Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Commr. Of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 59293 (1983) (striking down a state use tax that singled out the press for special treatment).
See also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992) (holding that even so-called "unprotected" speech is not "entirely invisible to the Constitution" and may not be regulated in
ways that otherwise offend First Amendment values).
283 See Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Rptg. Publg. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999).
284 See id. at 40.
285 See id. at 42-45. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas,
asserted that a "restriction upon access that allows access to the press (which in effect
makes the information part of the public domain), but at the same time denies access to
persons who wish to use the information for certain speech purposes, is in reality a restriction upon speech rather than upon access to government information." !d. at 42. Justice
Ginsberg, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter and Breyer, agreed
with Justice Scalia on that point and added: "To be sure, the provision of address information is a kind of subsidy to people who wish to speak to or about arrestees, and once a State
decides to make such a benefit available to the public, there are no doubt limits to its
freedom to decide how that benefit will be distributed." !d. at 42-43. And Justice Stevens,
in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, would have held that the statute was
unconstitutional because it made the information generally available, but denied it to "a
narrow category of persons solely because they intend to use the information for a constitutionally protected purpose." !d. at 45.
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statute, and every state and the federal government has enacted
some kind of open records law. 2 M6 To a greater or lesser extent,
each of those laws contains exceptions to a general disclosure requirement that represent the legislature's determination that some
other value outweighs the public's interest in the information. 287
When those exceptions involve such values as personal privacy, for
example, the courts have historically "balanced the public interest
in disclosure against privacy interests." 288 With respect to the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), however, Professors Halstuk and Davis have shown that "the scope of acceptable public
interest arguments in favor of disclosure" has been sharply narrowed by an unfortunate distortion of the "central purpose" of the
act in US. Department ofJustice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, 289 in which the Court denied press access to cumulative "rap
sheets" held by the Justice Department.
Halstuk and Davis argue persuasively that two factors underlay
the Supreme Court's retrenchment: a sense that release of computerized databases is qualitatively different from release of the very
same information one paper record at a time; 290 and disapproval of
the uses to which released records are put, primarily by businesses
and lawyers. 291 Although enactment of the Electronic Freedom of
286 See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Tapping Officials' Secrets, at http:/
/www.rcfp.org/tapping/index.cgi (last visited Dec. 8, 2001). State statutes providing for
public access to government records were enacted as early as 1849, when the Wisconsin
legislature passed a public records law. See Comments, Public Inspection of State and Municipal
nxecutive Documents, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. ll05, ll05 (1976). A recent study of state public
records laws rated Vermont's the best in the country, but gave it only a B-. See Better
Government Association, Freedom of Information in the USA 6 (forthcoming; draft on file with
author).
287 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 552(b) (1 )-(9) (2001) (listing nine exemptions under the Federal
Freedom of Information Act [hereinafter FOIA]).
288 Martin E. Halstuk and Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest Be Damned: Lower Court
Treatment of the Reporters Committee "Central PU1pose" Reformulation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 983,
986 (2002) [hereinafter Halstuk & Davis]. The authors cite U.S. Dept. of the Air Force v. Rose,
425 U.S. 352, 361 (1972), for the proposition the FOIA exemptions should be "narrowly
construed" and that "balanced the public and social interest in disclosure against the individual's interest in protecting personal privacy against the social value of public disclosure
must be the device to determine whether information should be disclosed."
289 489 U.S. 749 (1989). Halstuk and Davis argue that Reporters Committee limits the "public interest" side of the balancing equation to information that "directly" addresses government operations or activities, not the data collected through those activities, even though
examining such data might shed even more light, albeit indirectly, on those activities. Halstuk & Davis, supra note 288, at 5-6.
2 90 See id. at 40-41 (quoting Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 764: "Plainly there is a vast
difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single clearing house of information.").
291 See Halstuk & Davis, supra note 288, at 43-45 (noting then:Judge Patricia Wald's observation that lawyers could find facts faster through FOIA requests than through civil discovery and businesses could use FOIA to get information about their competitors).
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Information Act (EFOIA) has partly overcome the first of these factors,292 they conclude that Reporters Committee and its progeny continue to restrict access to important information held by the
federal government. 293
According to Halstuk and Davis, form and purpose are impermissible grounds for denying access to public records as a matter of
statutory construction and official policy. A fully developed right
to know would make denial on those grounds constitutionally impermissible as well. I have elsewhere suggested that the First
Amendment proscribes suppressing information already in the
public domain by virtue of its form. 294 I submit that suppressing
information because the person requesting it is a lawyer seeking
discovery by other means, or an entrepreneur seeking information
on competitors, or a journalist seeking a news story, is precisely the
kind of discrimination that the First Amendment right to know forbids once government has decided to make the information public
in one form or another. At the very least, the government's interest in withholding such information must be balanced against the
public's interest in releasing it, without the artificial constraints imposed by Reporters Committee.
Again, one can find analogous reasoning in public forum doctrine. Government is under no compulsion to create a public forum where none existed by "long tradition." 295 If government
nevertheless chooses to create a public forum, it may "reserve the
forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as
long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view." 2m' But when government creates a public forum
292 Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 3, 110 Stat. 3049 (1996) (amending 5 U.S.C. 552(£) to include
electronic records within the definition of "record.").
293 See Halstuk & Davis, supra note 288, at 46.
29 4 See Eric B. Easton, Closing the Bam Door after the Genie is Out of the Bag: Recognizing a
"Httility Principle" in First Amendmentfurisfmtdence, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1995). The argument that computerized records may be withheld when paper records are available, albeit
with some etfon, is roughly analogous to the Kam case discussed in this article at 56-63.
The U.S. Department of State prevented Karn from exporting a cryptographic algorithm
in digital format, even though it was readily available abroad in text. Although the district
court upheld the department's ruling against Karn 's First Amendment challenge, see Kam
v. U.S. Dept. of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 10-13 (D.D.C. 1996), the administration soon thereafter
transferred authority over such exports from State to the Department of Commerce, cutting short any substantive review of that holding. See Karn v. U.S. Dept. of State, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3123 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1997) (per curiam opinion remanding the case in light
of the transfer). Karn's case was dismissed as moot following the transfer. See Phil Karn,
The AjJplied Cryptography Case: Only Americans Can Type!, at http:/ /people.qualcomm.com/
karn/export/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2001).
295 Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Loc. J<.auwtors' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
296 !d. at 46 (citing U.S. Postal Ser'V. v. Greenburgh Civic Assn., 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981)).
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generally open to the public for expressive purposes, reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions may apply, but "a contentbased prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest." 297 Similarly, government may withhold from the
public information that it alone possesses. 298 Or it can enact a law
releasing the information "for any public or private purpose," 299
subject only to explicit statutory exceptions. When government
has done the latter, as ours has, it may not then arbitrarily withhold
the information, absent some compelling interest that overrides
the public's interest in seeing the information come to light.
Whether the Court will reconsider its crabbed interpretation
of FOIA, as a matter of either statutory construction or constitutional requirement, may become apparent sooner rather than
later, as two lawsuits begin to work their way through the federal
courts. On December 5, 2001, the Center for National Security
Studies and others sought release of information about persons arrested and detained in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist
attacks. 300 The complaint alleges that the Department of Justice's
failure to release the requested information or even respond in a
timely manner violates not only FOIA, but also First Amendment
and common law rights of access. 301 And on November 28, 2001,
Pmy, 460 U.S. at 46 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981)).
Although even here, there must be limits. One cannot imagine the government indefinitely withholding access to, say, presidential papers. Can one?
299 EFOIA, P.L. 104-231, 2(a)(l), 110 Stat. 3048 (1996):
(a) Findings. The Congress finds that- (1) the purpose of section 552 of title 5,
United States Code, popularly known as the Freedom of Information Act, is to
require agencies of the Federal Government to make certain agency information available for public inspection and copying and to establish and enable
enforcement of the right of any person to obtain access to the records of such
agencies, subject to statutory exemptions, for any public or jrrivate purpose; (emphasis added).
300 Compl. for lnj. Relief at 12, Ctr. for Natl. Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dept. ofjustice, No. 01-2500
(D.D.C. filed Dec. 5, 2001). In their letters to Justice and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the plaintiffs couched their request for information in terms quoted from
DOJ's own criteria for expedited processing:
The 'information is urgently needed to inform the public concerning some
actual or alleged government activity;' the requesting organizations are primarily engaged in disseminating information to the public; the subject of the detainees 'is of widespread and exceptional media interest and the information
sought involves possible questions about the government's integrity which at:
feet public confidence,' and the information is needed immediately to prevent
"the loss of substantial due process rights" to individuals and 'threats to their
physical safety.'
/d. at 8. On Aug. 2, 2002, the court ordered the government to produce a list of the
identities of all individuals detained in connection with the investigation of the Sept. 11
terrorist attacks, then granted the Government's motion for a stay pending appeal. Ctr. for
Natl. Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dept. ofjustice, 217 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2002) (referring to
its order at 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2002)). Oral arguments before the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit were held Nov. 18, 2002.
301 See id. at 10-12. On Oct. 12, 2001, Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft issued a new statement of
297
298
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the American Historical Association and others sought a declaratory judgment setting aside President Bush's executive order governing the release of presidential documents 302 and an injunction
ordering the release of some 68,000 documents from the Reagan
Administration. 303
Neither of these cases puts either the statutory or constitutional questions as squarely as one might wish. The FOIA claim
implicates national security, as well as personal privacy exemptions;
the constitutional claim is limited to those "agency records that are
also court records"; 304 and the presidential papers case is controlled by another statute altogether. But both cases would afford
a sympathetic Supreme Court the opportunity to recognize a constitutional right to know and vindicate that right by balancing the
government's interest in withholding the records against the public's interest in disclosure. 305

c.
Finally, I turn to the right to know information in private
hands-information protected by copyright or so-called
paracopyright laws like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 306
Our starting point is a recognition that the right to know is already
an integral part of copyright law. Specifically, the right to know is
Bush administration policy on FOIA compliance emphasizing that disretionary disclosures
should be made "only after full and deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial and privacy interested that could be implicated" and promising that the Justice Department will defend agency decisions to withhold records, in whole or in part, unless they
"lack a sound legal basis." Memo from John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., to Heads of All Federal
Departments and Agencies, Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001), at http:/ /www.usdoj.
gov I oip/foiapost/200lfoiapostl9.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2001).
302 See Exec. Or. 13233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56025 (Nov. I, 2001) (entitled Further Implementation of the Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-07, allowing either a sitting president or
former president to block the release of the former president's records).
303 See Com pl. for Decl., Inj., and Mandamus Relief at 22, Am. Hist. Assn. v. Natl. Archives
and Recs. Admin., No. 01-2447 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 28, 2001). See also Bush Administration keeps
Reagan Recorcls Under Lock and Key, News Media Update (newsletter of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press) 3 Quly 23, 2001); Josh Chafetz, The White House Hides
History, The New Republic (Aug. 27, 2001), at http:/ /www.thenewrepublic.com/082701/
chafetz082701.html; Richard Reeves, In War, Truth and History Die First, Universal Press Syndicate (Nov. 16, 2001), at http:/ /www.richardreeves.com.
304 Com pl. for Inj. Relief at 11-12, Ctr. for Natl. Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dept. of justice, No. 012500 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 5, 2001).
305 Quite apart from federal and state open records laws, recognizing a constitutional
right to know might also release other closely held records in the public interest. Settlements that implicate public health or safety, for example, ought to be in the public domain, along with all relevant discovery materials.
30H See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the .First Amendment Skein, 54
STAN. L. REv. I, 24 (2001) [hereinafter Netanel] (defining "paracopyright" as technologyor contract-based protections against unauthorized access or use of digital content, such as
those afforded by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998)).
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advanced by several limitations on and exceptions to copyright law
that allow it to coexist with the First Amendment: 307 the fact-expression dichotomy, 308 the first sale doctrine, 309 the fair use defense,310 compulsory licensing, 311 and the limitations on purpose
and duration contained in the constitution's intellectual property
clause. 312 Together, these arguably satisfy whatever public importance test might be required by the First Amendment right to
know, and copyright might just as well have been discussed with
307 Netanel calls this notion the "Nimmer Exoneration." /d. at 7-12 (citing Melville B.
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
UCLA L. REv. 1180 (1970), and noting the distortion of Nimmer's analysis by courts in
holding that copyright does not implicate the First Amendment).
308 The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that "Copyright protection subsists ... in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression," 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a), but
"[i]n no case does copyright protection ... extend to any idea ... embodied in such work."
17 U.S.C. § 102 (b). See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
350 ("As applied to a factual compilation, assuming the absence of original written expression, only the compiler's selection and arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may
be copied at will."); Harper & Row Pub!., Inc. v. The Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985) ("First Amendment protections [are] already embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas .... ").
309 "[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or
any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or. otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord." 17
U.S.C. 109(a). See, e.g., Amer. Inti. Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir.
1978) ("The exclusive right to vend a copy of a copyrighted work extends only to the first
sale of that copy. Mter the first sale of a copy the copyright holder has no control over the
occurrence or conditions of further sales of it." (citation omitted)). The free lending library, for example, depends in part on the first sale doctrine to immunize its operations
from liability for copyright infringement. See generally Laura N. Gasaway, Values Conflict in
the Digital Environment: Librarians versus Copyrightholders, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 115
(2000).
310 "[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching... , scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright."
17 U.S.C. § 107. See, e.g., Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d
1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The scope of [fair use] is undoubtedly wider when the information conveyed relates to matters of high public concern."). But see Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 559 ("It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord lesser
rights in those works that are of greatest importance to the public.").
311 See 17 U.S.C. 111 (secondary transmissions of broadcast signals), 115 (making and
distributing phonorecords), 116 (jukeboxes), 118 (noncommercial broadcasting). Compulsory licenses represent an attempt to accommodate the monopoly rights of authors and
inventors under copyright and patent law with other social needs or political choices. See,
e.g., Theodore C. Bailey, Student Author, Innovation and Access: The Role of Compulsory Licensing in the Development and Distribution of HN/AIDS Drugs, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & PoLICY 193, 217 (concluding that compulsory licensing of HIVI AlDS drugs in developing
countries contributes to a socially optimal balance between discovery and distribution).
But see Salah Basalamah, Compulsory Licensing for Translation: An Instrument of Development?, 40 IDEA 503 (2000) (advocating an international fair use regime for less developed
countries to replace the current compulsory license for translation).
312 U.S. Const. art. I, 8 ("The Congress shall have Power. .. [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.... "). Courts have explicitly rejected the assertion that the language in this clause imposes any substantive limitation on
congressional authority to set copyright teqns and conditions. See, e.g., Schnapper v. Foley,
667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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libel and privacy law in Part IV of this article to demonstrate that
the public importance test is alive and well.
Alive, perhaps, but not so well these days. All of these safeguards are currently under assault in Congress and the courts.:>~':>~ A
growing number of important books, articles, and amicus briefs attest to the concern within the academic community that the protections accorded privately held information have expanded
beyond tolerable levels under the First Amendment.:>~ 14 As those
protections expand, the body of information in the public domain
is diminished, rather than enhanced as the framers envisioned. 315
So far, however, most courts have been reluctant to look beyond
the statute to see the constitutional significance of this erosion in
the right to know. 316 Even where courts have applied a First
Amendment analysis, the results have perpetuated the power of the
copyright holders. 317
:'113 See, e.g., the "Sonny Bono" Copyright Term Extension Act [hereinafter CTEA], Pub.
L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (extending the copyright term by 20 years); the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act [hereinafter DMCA], Pub, L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (generally prohibiting the circumvention of technology used to prevent access to or
copying of works protected by copyright, as well as the trafficking in circumvention technology); Collection of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R.2652, 105th Cong. (1998)
(database protection legislation passed by the House but dropped from the Conference
Report on the DMCA). The CTEA was upheld against a First Amendment challenge in
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) affd, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003), while the DMCA
survived a constitutional assault in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
25330 (2d Cir. Nov. 28, 2001).
314 See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, Digital Cojryright 14 (Prometheus Books 2001) ("If current
trends continue unabated ... we are likely to experience a violent collision between our
expectations of freedom of expression and the enhanced copyright law."); Br. of Amicus
Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union et al., Universal City Studios, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
25330; see also infra text accompanying notes 315, 319-23.
315 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, F'ree ns the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 354-55 (1999) (Although the First
Amendment requires a "robust" public domain, "our society is making a series of decisions
that will subject more of the ways in which each of us uses information to someone else's
exclusive control.").
:'llfi Netanel points out that Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (llth
Cir. 200 I) (vacating an injunction barring publication of the parody The Wind Done Gone as
an unlawful prior restraint) marked the first time that an appellate court had applied the
First Amendment's Press Clause to constrain enforcement of a copyright. See Netanel, supra
note 306, at 2.
317 In Universal City Studios, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25330, the court acknowledged that
the computer code embodying the DVD decryption algorithm DeCSS was "speech" within
the meaning of the First Amendment, but found that the ii~junction issued under the
DMCA to bar the defendants from posting the algorithm on their web sites or linking to
other web sites carrying the algorithm implicated non-speech, functional component.~ of
the algorithm, in the case of posting, and the hyperlink, in the case of linking. Having
established that the injunction was content-neutral, the court then held that it survived the
heightened scrutiny test of Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
A California appellate court reached a different result, however, when the recording
industry tried to enjoin the posting of DeCSS under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Civ.
Code § 3426.1 et seq. In DVD Cojry Control Assn. v. Bunner, 2001 Cal. App. LEXIS 1 l 79 (6th
App. Dist. Nov. 1, 2001), the court held that the lower court's injunction against future
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Proposed remedies for this erosion have included denying
copyright to newsworthy works, 318 providing heightened First
Amendment scrutiny for copyright regulation, 319 limiting preliminary injunctions against copyright infringers, 320 reformulating the
fair use doctrine to give greater weight to speech than to market
concerns, 321 creating an independent First Amendment privilege
beyond fair use, 322 even permitting abandonment of copyright altogether in favor of technological self-help. 323 Any of these alternatives would reinvigorate the right to know with respect to
copyright, although most would operate in practice as defenses to
an infringement or circumvention complaint and, therefore, require an actor willing to risk liability for making a mistake (the
dreaded "chilling effect").
For certain works in which the public interest is especially
high, I would have Congress provide a "condemnation" proceeding,324 initiated by the government or a private actor, who would
disclosure of DeCSS was an unconstitutional prior restraint and that Bunner's First Amendment rights trumped DVDCCA's statutory right to protect its trade secrets. /d. at 32-34.
The court cited copyright law's constitutional pedigree and statutory safety valves to distinguished it from the trade secret statute at issue here.
318 See, e.g., Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795 (1992) ("[Defendant]
contends that... we should adopt a bright-line rule that no videotape of a newsworthy
event is copyrightable because its creator's proprietary interest must give way to the public's First Amendment right of access to information.").
319 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 306, at 54 ("[C]opyright law constitutes content-neutral
speech regulation that should be subject to heightened (Turner), but not strict, scrutiny.").
320 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DuKE LJ. 147, 210 (1998) (asserting that preliminary injunctions
should be permitted only in cases involving literal copying).
321 See, e.g., Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for
Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REv. 107, 113 (2001) ("[A]s owners' rights are expanded to respond
to the ease with which digital technology enables large scale infringement, users' rights
should, correspondingly, be reconceived to reflect the variety of ways the Internet facilitates-indeed encourages-production, access, and use of copyrighted content."); L. Ray
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright & Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REv. l, 61 ( 1987) (a rational fair use
doctrine would distinguish the impermissible use of a copyright by a competitor from the
protected use of the underlying work by a consumer).
322 See, e.g., Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and
its Impact on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. l, 51-52 (advocating an independent
First Amendment privilege, outside the scope of fair use, based on factors such as a public
interest in the copyrighted work and the necessity for access to it); HenryS. Hoberman,
Copyright and the First Amendment: Freedom or Monopoly of Expression, 14 PEPP. L. REv. 5 71 ,
(1987) ("The first amendment should protect unconsented use of copyrighted material
when the alleged infringer can show (1) necessity, (2) originality, and (3) advancement of
first amendment interests.").
323 See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, &cape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the
Protection of I<.xpressive Wm"ks, 69 U. CINN. L. REv. 741 (2001) (asserting that copyright owners should have the right to choose between the rights accorded by federal copyright law
and technological self-help measures and accompanying common law protections);julie E.
Cohen, Copyright and Thejwisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1089, 1141 (1998)
(advocating a right to hack digital code that prevents users from exercising those copyright
privileges required by the First Amendment).
324 The term "condemnation," of course, is a real property concept, but I use it here
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seek a declaration that the public importance of the work is so
great that some rights must be taken from the copyright owner and
dedicated to the public. 32 ;; Obviously, there is a legitimate public
interest in much of the copyrightable work in private hands, and
any or all of the remedies suggested above could be employed to
ensure that copyright protection does not impair the public's access to it. Under my proposal, only works of extraordinary importance to the public could be condemned at taxpayer expense,
among them perhaps the famous Zapruder film of President Kennedy's assassination. 326
Another such work is Dr. Martin Luther King's "I Have a
Dream" speech, delivered at the Lincoln Memorial during the civil
rights leader's Aug. 28, 1963, March on Washington. 327 Dr. King
applied for a statutory copyright about a month later, then successfully pursued an injunction against the sale of unauthorized recordings of the speech. 328 More than 30 years later, CBS produced
a documentary containing about sixty percent of the speech. 329
The King estate, which owned the copyright, sued, but the district
court granted CBS's motion for summary judgment on the ground
that, under the 1909 Copyright Act, the work entered the public
domain by virtue of its "general publication" on Aug. 28, 1963. 330
The court of appeals reversed, remanding the cause for a trial on
whether a general publication in fact occurred. 331 Neither court
reached the fair use issue, and the case was settled in July 2000. 332
only to suggest that the device I propose resembles the familiar "taking" of private property
for public use with just compensation. I do not mean to imply any closer similarity between copyright and rights in real property.
32fi Professor Litman has written that seasoned copyright experts could not agree
whether it is even possible to dedicate works to the pubic domain after the Berne Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). See Litman, supra note 314, at
76 n.10.
3 2fi See Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis A~soc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). When
Time, Inc., used considerable parts of the Zapruder film without permission, the court
found the use was fair. But the "fair use" defense is hardly a reliable safeguard when market value is weighed more heavily than public importance. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
566.
327 The text of the speech is widely available. See, e.g., The Douglass Archives of American Public Address, at http:/ /douglass.speech.nwu.edu/king_bl2.htm (last visited Dec.
17, 2001).
328 See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir.
1999).
32\l See id.
330 /d. at 1213-14.
33l See id. at 1220.
332 On july 12, 2000, The Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Nonviolent Social Change
issued a press release announcing terms of the settlement. CBS News would "retain the
right to use its footage of the speeches," and would "also have the right to license its footage to others while providing contact information, as appropriate, regarding the Estate's
claimed intellectual property rights." The release went on to say that CBS would provide
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No one can deny the vital importance of this speech, and especially film of this speech, to the public. It represents a pivotal moment in twentieth century American social and political history.
Yet, short of misuse, 333 there is no mechanism under the 1976 Act
for a copyright to enter the public domain before expiration unless
it is dedicated to the public by the copyright owner. 334 The socalled "fact-expression" dichotomy affords no relief; no mere
description of this speech, nor even its text, could adequately convey all or even a substantial portion of the "information" the public
requires. 335 The sight, the sound, the setting-all of these are our
history. Moreover, nothing less than the full speech will do, negating any possibility that fair use will suffice. 336 While some form of
compulsory license might give the film some circulation, control
would remain in the hands of those who could afford the license
fee rather than the public at large. 337 Finally, any concern that the
film would be put to some less-than-enlightened uses might be
ameliorated by allowing the author's estate to retain a quasi-moral
right to preserve the integrity of the work. 338
If condemnation seems a narrow and problematic reform, it is
footage of the speeches for use by the King Estate and would make a contribution to the
King Center. Available at http:/ /wwww.thekingcenter.org/tkc/press_release/07-12-2000.
htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2001).
333 Misuse of copyright is an equitable defense to an infringement action based on the
plaintiff's attempt to leverage its copyright to acquire an exclusive right or limited monopoly beyond those afforded by copyright law. See, e.g., Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,
911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990). While the effect of misuse is suspension of the plaintiffs
capacity to bring an infringement action, plaintiff can purge itself of the misuse and recover all of its copyright rights. /d. at 979, n.22.
334 Under the 1909 Act, which governed Dr. King's copyright, a "general publication" of
the speech might have precluded protection as a literary work and thrust the speech into
the public domain. That issue was actually litigated the same year in King v. Mister Maestro,
Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), with the court holding that Dr. King's public delivery of the speech and his providing the press with an advance copy of the text did not
constitute a general publication. In the CBS case, the district court explicitly and substantively disagreed with that decision: "As one of the most public and most widely disseminated speeches in history, it could be the poster child for general publication." Estate of
Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
33.~ See Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaranties of Free
Speech and the Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180, 1197 (1970) ("It would be intolerable if the
public's comprehension of.the full meaning of My Lai could be censored by the copyright
owner of the photographs."):
33fi See Harper & Row, 471 U,$. at 565-66 (holding that taking even a relatively small
portion of the original work can' negate the fair use defense).
337 Hoberman considers compulsory licenses a "tax on free speech" that is repugnant to
First Amendment values. See Hoberman, supra note 322, at 593-94.
33!l This is not the place to go into whether the right of integrity exists. in the United
States. For a discussion on the various copyright law provisions, common law protections,
and court decisions that may satisfY the Berne Convention, see H.R. Rpt. 100-609, at 32-34
(1988). In any event, the King Estate has already alienated some of Dr. King's former
associates by licensing the film for use in an Alcatel commercial. See Controversy Over Use of
King Name, promoting a segment on the Dec. 2, 2001, edition of CBS's 60 Minutes, at http:/
/www.cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,319500-412,00.shtrnl (last visited Dec. 13, 2001).
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at least a step toward unwinding the constraints within which copyright is enclosing the informational commons. 339
Coupled with some of the other reforms suggested above, the
taking of copyright in the public interest will help expand the
amount of important information in the public domain and reduce the control exercised by an increasingly concentrated media
industry. 340
Indeed, it may come to pass that some limitation of copyright
may play a role in preventing further consolidation of the media
industry, if not rolling back such consolidation as has already occurred. Antitrust scholars are already looking at the media industry as a potential target for intervention, 341 but, in my view, they
face serious First Amendment obstacles. This is not to say that the
media industry is immune from antitrust action to block mergers
or break up monopolies; the case law clearly shows otherwise. 342
Where the rationale for antitrust action is economic, the First
Amendment has nothing to say. But where the rationale for antitrust action is the same as the rationale for direct government regulation-the need to preserve some minimal number of voices in
the marketplace of ideas-the First Amendment stands as an insurmountable barrier. Any such action that requires the government
to inquire into the substance, as well as the number, of messages
reaching the public would, in my view, invoke strict scrutiny.
But, to the extent that consolidation of the media industry is a
function of copyright protection (as Professor Benkler has argued343), it might be slowed or rolled back by selective curtailment
of copyright, without First Amendment implications. 344 Because
the grant of copyright is, itself, a privileged exception to the First
Amendment, the withdrawal of one or more exclusive rights or
shortening of the copyright term when the protected matter is of
public importance, cannot but advance First Amendment interests.
Although the Copyright Office takes no notice of a work before
copyright "subsists," and conducts only a modest review for
See Benkler, sufJra note 315, at 354-55.
See id. at 410 ("(I]ncreases in copyright protection .... is likely to lead, over time, to
concentration of a greater portion of the information production function in society in the
hands of large commercial organizations that vertically integrate new production with
owned-information inventory management.").
341 See, e.g., Lande, supra note 170.
34 2 See supra text accompanying note 149.
343 See supra text accompanying note 340.
3 44 But see David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16
BERK~:LEY TECH. LJ. 729 (2001) (arguing against making the exercise of legitimate IP rights
the basis for antitrust action, absent abuse such as conditional refusal to license which
expands the rights-owner's power beyond that granted by Congress).
339
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copyrightability before registration, nothing in the constitutional
authority given to Congress requires such forbearance. Copyright
examinations could be made as exhaustive as patent examinations
if Congress wished it so. 345 Thus, inquiry into the substance of
messages withheld from the public domain by copyright poses no
further intrusion on the First Amendment than the copyright privilege itsel£.346
As a practical matter, the inquiry that I suggest into the public
importance of a protected work would occur only after a condemnation claim has been filed. Congress might designate the Register
of Copyrights to conduct the inquiry and impose an appropriate
disposition: withdrawal of copyright, with or without compensation, reduction of term, or some limitation on exclusive rights. 347
Any such action would be appealable to the courts.
The scope of this proposal is limited indeed; it offers no answer to private control of information of less than surpassing importance. That would require a sweeping reevaluation of the
relationship between copyright and mass-audience news in general.
I believe such a reevaluation could lead to the public's recovering
most of the exclusive copyright rights to journalistic work product
in exchange for rights of integrity and attribution. 348 If one assumes that today's media giants participate in the hard news enterprise solely for prestige and legitimacy, such a "bargain" should
create incentives to produce more (at least not less) newsworthy
345 The distinction between copyrights and patents in this regard is generally attributed
to absence of a novelty requirement in copyright law. Authors are free to create new works
that precisely match pre-existing works, so long as the first work is not copied and the
match is purely coincidental. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTI' LAW,
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT, IN A NuTSHELL 399 (West 3d ed. 2000). But this
distinction is a practical one created by Congress; the constitutional charge is identical as
to both kinds of intellectual property.
346 One might argue that giving government the opportunity to reward or penalize an
author by a grant or denial of copyright protection, based on the content of the work, is
impermissible under the First Amendment. Yet that is precisely the nature of "fair use," so
the power is already woven into the fabric of the copyright law. Where prior restraint is the
status quo ante, one cannot say that any relief violates freedom of speech because it is
incomplete.
347 In particular, the right to make derivative works could be dedicated to the public
with little harm to the copyright owner and great benefit to the public. See, e.g., Eric B.
Easton, Annotating the News: Mitigating the njfects of Media Convergence and Consolidation, 23
UALR L. REv. 143, 148-50 (2000) (arguing that annotating news stories should not be
considered infringement of the copyright owner's exclusive right to make derivative
works).
!148 I have only begun to work through this theme, but, at the inoment, I believe that the
reproduction right should be preserved for compilations and other collective works; otherwise, the rights to reproduce and distribute a single news story, to make annotations and
other derivative works, and to perform or display the work publicly would all be dedicated
to the public domain. In return, the. "author" would be guaranteed prominent attribution
and some protection from distortion (although not criticism).
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information and to disseminate it more widely. 349 To the extent
that profitability matters, that could be accommodated by structuring the transaction in the nature of a compulsory license for, say,
the first 24 hours.
Of course, that raises all sorts of questions about defining journalism and other publicly important information, but those questions are already being raised. 350 That the New York Times and The
Washington Post have become "private copyright cops," 351 controlling how their stories may be used (or abused), is anathema to any
meaningful notion of a free press. Only when the public's right to
know is given full effect through the application of a public importance test, may copyright law actually achieve the purpose intended
by the framers-to be the "engine of free expression." 352
VI.

SECOND THOUGHTS

The thesis of this article-that a penumbral First Amendment
right to know is manifest in a public importance test that ( 1) is
routinely applied by the courts in some areas and (2) ought to be
applied more rigorously in others-raises at least two troublesome
issues. The first is whether deference to proprietary interests such
as personal privacy, government secrecy, and copyright is necessary, as a practical matter, to preserve core freedoms of speech and
publishing; the second, whether investing in courts the power to
determine what is publicly important undermines both the prerogatives of the political branches and the independence of journalists. As noted above, the first of these comes from Alexander Bickel
349 Legendary CBS Chairman William Paley supposedly once explained why he continued to invest in money-losing hard-news coverage: "I hate losing the money, but I like what
it buys me in respectability and licensing protection." Jane Mayer, Bad News, THE NEw
YORKER, Aug. 14, 2000, at 30, 35, quoted in David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEx.
L. REV. 429, 454 n.126 (2002).
350 As this article was being finished, Professor David Anderson published an important
new article that deserves far more attention than can be given here. Professor Anderson
argues that the Press Clause of the First Amendment, as distinct from the Speech Clause,
must be invoked if we are to preserve those legal preferences enjoyed by what we have
traditionally viewed as "the press." See Anderson, supra note 349, at 528. Doing so, however, requires us to distinguish between the broadly defined provision of information accomplished by any number of economic actors in this information age - and the functions traditionally performed by journalists. See id. at 448-49. That, in turn, requires content discrimination based on importance. See id. at 530. Professor Anderson notes that such
discrimination has been with us since the "beginning of the republic," albeit masked by
proxies such as format, frequency and means of distribution, and essentially denied in First
Amendment theory. !d. at 528-29. Although I remain uncomfortable with Professor Anderson's suggestion that such discrimination be undertaken by all levels and branches of
government, /d. at 528, I embrace his sense of the importance of public importance.
351 SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND CoPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 188 (2001).
352 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
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by way of President Bollinger; 353 the second from Justices Harlan
and Marshall. 354 But they are two sides of the same coin: trust.
Bollinger believes we, the people, cannot be trusted with really
important information and, what is more, do not want to be burdened with it. As the right to gather news becomes stronger, he
wrote,
we are being forced to confront the disconcerting fact that
much information in this or any society is better left unspoken,
often because of a legitimate distrust of the process of public
discussion. As this occurs, we will come to discover that the law
of property is relied upon to protect us from completely 'uninhibited' and 'wide-open' dissemination of information, while we
claim a contrary self-image. 355

A decade later, Professor Sunstein would take Bollinger's distrust of the public to yet another level-for the Internet age. 356
Faced with a nearly infinite array of information choices, Sunstein
writes, we will gravitate toward those that reflect our own views and
concerns and filter out those with which we disagree or in which
we have little interest. Left to our own devices, we will splinter into
enclaves of like-minded people, deprive ourselves of new or challenging information, and forgo the shared experiences that are so
vital to our democracy. The more consumer freedom we exercise,
the more political freedom we lose. 357
Sunstein believes that we can save ourselves from this fate by
putting our consumer preferences aside and, as responsible citizens acting through our government, force ourselves to take the
medicine we need. While this can be done voluntarily, there is no
reason to fear regulation. Mter all, what we mistakenly think of as
freedom of the press is really only a system of property allocations
enforced by law and regulation at taxpayer expense. So it is really
quite a small matter to adjust those property rights into a configuration that better serves our democracy. 358
If Bollinger and Sunstein are right, Madison must have been
wrong, and the First Amendment should be rewritten to authorize
Congress to make whatever laws may be necessary to ensure that
government can protect the people from their own weaknesses and
the media companies that would exploit those weaknesses for
353
354
355
35n
357
358

See supra text accompanying notes 277-78.
See supra text accompanying note 1.
Bollinger, supra note 113, at 145.
See Sunstein, supra note 140.
See id. at 44-50.
See id. at 128-131.
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profit. But was it not Congress that created the system of property
allocations that brought us to this sorry state of affairs? If Professor
Litman's brief history of copyright law is any indication, we the
people will be the last to benefit when and if Congress reallocates
those property rights.~r' 9
If not Congress, then who? The dissenting opinions in Rosenbloom presaged the consensus in Gertz that courts should stay out of
it. Justice Harlan's observation is quoted above;~ 60 herewith, Justice Marshall's:
In order for particular defamation to come within the privilege
there must be a determination that the event was of legitimate
public interest. That determination will have to be made by
courts generally and, in the last analysis, by this Court in particular. Courts, including this one, are not anointed with any extraordinary prescience. But, assuming that ... courts are not
simply to take a poll to determine whether a substantial portion
of the population is interested or concerned in a subject, courts
will be required to somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest in
a particular event or subject; what information is relevant to selfgovernment. The danger such a doctrine portends for freedom of the
press seems apparent. 361

But is the danger really so apparent? Intuitively, Justice Marshall's concern rings true. No journalist wants to be second-guessed
by a judge as to which stories are newsworthy and which are not.
As a practical matter, though, the worst case scenario looks a lot
like the situation that exists today. By construing public importance narrowly, courts could subject journalists to greater risk of
liability in private facts cases and greater damages in private plaintiff libel cases. By construing public importance narrowly, courts
could reduce the likelihood of a fair use defense to copyright infringement. By construing public importance narrowly, courts
could decline to excuse news gathering torts or to pry information
from government agencies. How is that dangerous?
Recognizing a constitutional right to know would put more
public importance decisions in the hands of judges. But it is difficult to see how judges, even in the worst case, could constrict the
flow of information to the public beyond today's baseline. In any
event, there is no reasonable alternative.

359
360
3GI

Litman, sujmt note 314, at 63.
See supra text accompanying note 186.
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

